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The ‘Territory of the Union’ in EU Citizenship Law: Charting a Route from Parallel to Integrated 
Narratives  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne* 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and 
asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it 
builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary 
dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within – but also beyond – 
which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that 
respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim 
of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to 
which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union 
territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different ‘narratives’ of Union territory 
have materialised in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated 
lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of 
Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States and for the system 




This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and 
asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it 
builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law1 by adding a complementary 
dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory in the sense of what Lindahl describes 
as ‘the closure of space into a legal place, into a bounded region’.2 Additionally, ‘the concreteness of 
territoriality involves a claim to commonality; a territory is held to be the place of a collective, a 
 
* School of Law, University of Edinburgh. This work was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Major Research 
Fellowship (2016-2019). Huge thanks to Loïc Azoulai, Stephen Coutts, Christophe Hillion, Graeme Laurie, 
Joanne Scott and Jo Shaw for, against any reasonable expectation, slotting an earlier draft of this paper into 
their ‘summer reading’ and for the invaluable comments and dialogues that followed.  
1 E.g. L Azoulai, S Barbou des Places and E Pataut (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, 
Identities (Hart Publishing, 2016); C O’Brien, ‘I Trade, Therefore I am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’ 
(2013) 50 CML Rev 1643. 
2 H Lindahl, ‘Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity’ 
(2004) 29 EL Rev 461, 461 (emphasis added); he notes that ‘[w]hereas “place”, harking back to the Greek 
notion of topos, can be provisionally defined as a bounded region, “space”, especially in its modern 
connotations, stands for a boundless extension’ (462). 
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common place’.3 These elements of legal place and common place are used here to anchor, explore 
and impart a deeper understanding of territory in EU citizenship law. In that respect, the paper offers 
a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind 
of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable 
from the territories of the Member States.4 It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies 
‘outside’. However, it will be shown that different ‘narratives’ of Union territory have materialised in 
the case law of the Court of Justice. In this sense, common values that shape Union territory as a legal 
place are used in different ways or to different degrees. Ultimately, it is argued that these segregated 
lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of 
Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States and for the system 
underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed. 
The territory of the Union became meaningful as a legal place that both draws from and, in 
turn, transmits and reinforces common values within the process of constructing the EU legal order. 
In that respect, three different acts can be identified around the judicial contribution in particular: 
first, and most basically, simply stating what the features of the EU legal order actually are; second, 
clarifying why and/or how those decisions were reached; and, third, dealing with the implications or 
repercussions of the decisions that were taken. These three acts can be described as instances of 
articulation, explanation and confrontation. Sometimes, they happen in sequence i.e. across different 
cases over time, but they can also manifest within the same case. In systemic terms, for example, the 
judgments in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL both articulated the principles of the direct effect 
and primacy of EU law and explained them through the language of the ‘new legal order…for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals’.5 While the Court did say 
in Costa v ENEL that the EEC Treaty ‘created its own legal system’,6 the autonomy of the EU legal order 
and the consequences of its characterisation as such were explained and confronted in more detail as 
the case law evolved.7 Judgments that established a system of State liability for breaches of EU law or 
 
3 Ibid 468 (emphasis in original); drawing from H Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago University Press, 
1958) 52. 
4 Though emphasising that the Court of Justice is not, through EU citizenship law, ‘making a claim to territorial 
self-determination on behalf of the Union in a thick meaning of the concept under international law’ (S Coutts, 
‘The Shifting Geometry of Union Citizenship: Between Transnational and Supranational’, forthcoming). 
5 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
6 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66 (emphasis added); see similarly, the reference to the ‘law stemming 
from the Treaty’ as ‘an independent source of law’ having a ‘special and original nature’. 
7 See esp. Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR), EU:C:2014:2454 and Opinion 1/17 (CETA), EU:C:2019:341. See 
generally, N Nic Shuibhne, ‘What is the Autonomy of EU Law, and Why Does That Matter?’ (2019) 88 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 9. 
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confirmed its horizontal reach in certain circumstances provide further examples of confronting the 
implications of primacy and direct effect.  
The same dynamics can be seen in EU citizenship law. Most famously, the requirement to 
treat EU citizens equally with host State nationals was first articulated in Martínez Sala;8 it was then 
explained through the idea that Union citizenship is the ‘fundamental status’ of Member State 
nationals in Grzelczyk;9 and its reach has been confronted in several threads of case law ever since. In 
his Opinion for Morgan and Bucher, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer suggested that ‘the 
constant evolution of the ideas which inspired the creation of the [Union] has slowed down’.10 In that 
light, whether in EU law generally or EU citizenship law specifically, it is normally through the need for 
confrontation that the more difficult contests are now waged. Explanations for the choices made 
necessarily deepen as a result but they also become more complex. The objective of ensuring 
coherence intensifies in importance; but the risk of producing conflicting lines of reasoning grows too. 
Especially since its articulation in Ruiz Zambrano,11 the concept of the ‘territory of the Union’ 
has a distinctive legal significance in EU citizenship law. But how is ‘territory’ defined or understood 
in that context? What is its legal meaning, and what are the implications of attributing legal meaning 
to territory in the first place? In this paper, following a brief overview of the roots of territory as a 
concept of EU law in a general sense (Section II), three explanatory narratives of the territory of the 
Union are drawn from citizenship case law. The first narrative (Section III) takes the judgment in Ruiz 
Zambrano as its starting point and examines how the Court shaped a ‘right to stay within the territory 
of the European Union’ in the case law that followed.12 In particular, the Court later explained that the 
right to stay has an ‘an intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement of a Union citizen’.13 In 
other words, the right to stay just now in this particular legal place was rationalised on the basis of 
facilitating and protecting the Union citizen’s exercise of free movement and residence rights for the 
future. This case law constitutes the point of construction of the territory of the Union as a legally 
meaningful concept. On that understanding, the first narrative is presented as the foundational 
narrative of territory in EU citizenship law. 
However, while an ‘intrinsic connection’ with freedom of movement was undoubtedly a 
necessary point of explanation for the purposes of first defence, it proves also to be insufficient – or 
at least, incomplete. In subsequent judgments that build directly on Ruiz Zambrano, a more 
 
8 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala, EU:C:1998:217, paras 62-63. 
9 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 31. 
10 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher, EU:C:2007:174, para. 2 of 
the Opinion.  
11 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124. 
12 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 42; see also, para. 44. 
13 Case C-40/11 Iida, EU:C:2012:691, para. 72; confirmed in e.g. Case C-87/12 Ymeraga and Others, 
EU:C:2013:291, para. 37 and Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:675, para. 75.  
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complicated picture of what Union territory as a legal place can offer has unfolded.14 But even more 
importantly for present purposes, different stories emanate from case law where Union citizenship 
intersects with the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).15 In the second narrative mapped in 
this paper (Section IV.A), the key judgments – Petruhhin16 and Raugevicius17 – concern extradition 
requests by third States i.e. requests seeking the extradition of Union citizens outside Union territory. 
In response, the Court innovates in order to keep the business of the Union citizen within the territory 
of the Union. The AFSJ is the relevant territorial zone in this narrative, but the explanation for the legal 
solutions developed is framed around protection of the citizens affected, which in turn protects the 
status of Union citizenship more abstractly i.e. producing a protective narrative. The objective of 
preserving freedom of movement does coincide with the outcomes proposed by the Court but is not 
foregrounded on its own terms. The role of other EU values, and especially the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, becomes much more evident in the protective narrative. Crucially, however, the Court’s 
methods for keeping Union citizens ‘inside’ depend in the end on how the Member States trust and 
therefore cooperate with each other within the framework of the AFSJ.  
The conditions that yield the protective narrative therefore entrench the idea of Union 
territory as a legal place underpinned by common values; and as a place where the EU legal order is 
engaged to protect Union citizens. In other situations, however, animating wider EU objectives and 
values seems, for its own sake, to take precedence over the interests of the citizen. In this third, 
systemic narrative (Section IV.B), the protective dynamic transfers from concern for the citizen to 
concern for sustaining the EU legal order – even where this might result in the interests of the citizen 
being subdued or sacrificed. In such cases, concern can manifest for how the system operates within 
the territory of the Union (as in Pisciotti18) but it can also extend outwards, towards the external 
territories up against which the Union inevitably bumps (thinking of the pathway tentatively laid in RO 
for post-Brexit relations between the EU and the UK19). In RO, any overt connection to Union 
 
14 See e.g. Case C-221/17 Tjebbes, EU:C:2019:189, para. 46: ‘following the loss, by operation of law, of 
Netherlands nationality and of citizenship of the Union the person concerned would be exposed to limitations 
when exercising his or her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, including, 
depending on the circumstances, particular difficulties in continuing to travel to the Netherlands or to another 
Member State in order to retain genuine and regular links with members of his or her family, to pursue his or 
her professional activity or to undertake the necessary steps to pursue that activity. Also relevant [is] … the 
serious risk, to which the person concerned would be exposed, that his or her safety or freedom to come and 
go would substantially deteriorate because of the impossibility for that person to enjoy consular protection 
under Article 20(2)(c) TFEU in the territory of the third country in which that person resides’. 
15 For Lindahl, ‘place is essential to the very possibility and concrete actualisation of freedom, security and 
justice’ (n2 above, 462). 
16 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630. 
17 Case C-247/17 Raugevicius, EU:C:2018:898. 
18 Case C-191/16 Pisciotti, EU:C:2018:222. 
19 Case C-327/18 PPU RO, EU:C:2018:733. 
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citizenship is quietly dropped. It will be also seen that confronting systemic tensions can disrupt the 
internal logic of the case law and alter, as a result, how the territory of the Union is constructed. The 
Court’s understanding of territory edges here into what Scott describes as the ‘contested transition 
zone between the territorial and the extraterritorial’.20 In that context, to some extent in the 
protective narrative but especially in the systemic narrative, the relationship between ‘territory’ and 
‘legal place’ has become much more complex than what geographical borders alone could suggest. 
It is important to acknowledge that there is significant overlap and evolution across the 
foundational, protective and systemic narratives of Union territory. The objective of protecting free 
movement rights provides the best example in both respects. In the foundational narrative, protecting 
freedom of movement, something that can only be exercised within Union borders, was arguably 
always more than a functional or instrumental goal: it represents respect for a value common to the 
Member States and therefore something that should infuse their decision-making at national level.21 
In the protective narrative, there is heightened reliance on – a wider range of – common values as 
well as deployment of the cooperative mechanisms of EU law that underpin them. That shift or 
evolution in perspective responds to a sharper inside/outside dichotomy from the perspective of 
consolidating Union territory and, in consequence, a deeper engagement with the protective 
prospects of Union territory as a particular kind of legal place. And what makes the Union the kind of 
legal place that it is comes back, in essence, to the system of the EU legal order.  
Nevertheless, the foundational, protective and systemic narratives are shown ultimately to 
institute parallel narratives. In particular, this is because their application is more selectively outcome-
oriented than chronological or sequential. In that light, the task here is to unearth the main driver – 
the dominant narrative – in each case, while acknowledging and allowing for overlap and evolution. 
Through the analytical lens of Union territory, difficult questions about the place of Union citizens (and 
Union citizenship) within the EU legal order therefore materialise. We often recall the idea from Van 
Gen den Loos that EU law ‘not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer 
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage’.22 But for present purposes, from the 
perspective of analysis framed around narratives, another statement from the same judgment can be 
emphasised: that ‘the nationals of the states brought together in the [Union] are called upon to 
cooperate in the functioning of this [Union]’ (emphasis added). This paper argues ultimately for a shift 
from parallel to integrated narratives, which entails confronting more openly and more consistently 
 
20 J Scott ‘The New EU “Extraterritoriality”’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1343, 1379. 
21 See esp. L Azoulai ‘Transfiguring European Citizenship: From Member State Territory to Union Territory’ in D 
Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP, 2017) 178; this point is examined in 
more detail in Section III below.  
22 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
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the citizen-specific, State-specific and system-specific interests at stake in any given case. Though not 
(ostensibly) a judgment in the area of Union citizenship, the ruling in Wightman is used as a template 
for reasoning that exemplifies integrated narratives.23 In this way, it is argued, the maturity of the EU 
legal order is both better reflected and more deeply consolidated. In particular, we are challenged to 
conceive of Union citizens, the Member States and the EU legal order itself as symbiotic essentials of 
the same ‘unique ecosystem’24 rather than as opposing elements more usually pitched competitively 
against each other in this distinctive legal place. 
 
II. The concept of territory in EU (citizenship) law 
 
The territory of the European Union consists, most basically, of the territories of its 28 Member States 
and Article 52(1) TEU provides that the Treaties ‘shall apply’ to all of these States, which it simply 
lists.25 Article 52(2) indicates that the ‘territorial scope of the Treaties is specified in Article 355 [TFEU]’, 
which concerns the extent to which the Treaties do (and do not) apply to the overseas countries and 
territories of the Member States. Taking these provisions together, ‘EU territory corresponds to the 
geographical space referred to in Article 52 TEU and Article 355 TFEU which define the territorial scope 
of the Treaties’.26 In the physical understanding of territory, the EU does not have control over 
determining its territory in the way that states do. However, through the critical gateway of 
membership, the Union does exercise control within processes that both extend (accession/Article 49 
TEU) and contract (withdrawal/Article 50 TEU) it.  
Importantly, though, the Union’s ‘physical’ and ‘legal’ territories do not always overlap. For 
example, while Article 26(2) TFEU establishes that ‘[t]he internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’, Article 63(2) TFEU provides that ‘all 
restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited’. Similarly, and especially for the purposes of the analysis in this paper, Article 3(2) 
TEU establishes that ‘[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
 
23 Case C-621/18 Wightman, EU:C:2018:999. 
24 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United 
Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Internal eu27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future 
relationship: “Regulatory Issues”, 21 February 2018, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta- 
political/files/slides_regulatory_issues.pdf>.  
25 In Boukhalfa, AG Léger noted that ‘Articles 198, paragraph 1, of the Euratom Treaty and Article 79 of the 
ECSC Treaty expressly limit the application of each of these treaties strictly to the “territory” of the Member 
States. In my opinion, the absence of any reference to this term in Article [52(1) TFEU] should not be regarded 
as a mere oversight on the part of the draftsmen, who after all took care to refer to it in the other treaties’ (AG 
Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1995:381, para. 30 of the Opinion). 
26 Case C-17/16 El Dakkak and Intercontinental, EU:C:2017:341, para. 22. 
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internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime’. The AFSJ is a proxy for Union territory at one level: in particular, its remit with 
respect to both internal and external borders27 does suggest a more ‘composite’ understanding of 
Union territory i.e. something beyond 28 individual Member State territorial units.28 However, the 
regulatory reach of the AFSJ can extend beyond the physical territory of the Union in some respects, 
on the one hand, yet, conversely, apply within fewer than the 28 Member States, on the other. The 
complex geography of the Schengen Area provides a good example of both of these points: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are associate members; Ireland and the United Kingdom have 
opt-outs; and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania have not yet joined.29 It is also worth noting that 
the Member States retain a key role in shaping the AFSJ in the sense that ‘strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational planning’ are defined by the European Council (Article 68 TFEU).30  
These structural examples already show that the territory of the Union is a complicated ‘legal 
place’ that cannot be reduced to geography in isolation. Following a brief account of the role of 
territory in EU law (Section II.A), its role in EU citizenship law specifically is then introduced (Section 
II.B). That discussion bridges in turn to the movement-centric ‘foundational narrative’ instituted by 
Ruiz Zambrano (Section III). 
 
A. Territory and the reach of EU law 
 
Approaching territory from a more consciously legal perspective, the central question concerns the 
‘reach’ of EU law and it tends to be expressed and examined in the broader language of territoriality 
 
27 See especially, Article 67(2) TFEU, which establishes that the Union ‘shall ensure the absence of internal 
border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border 
control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the 
purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals’. More thematic objectives – 
including respect for fundamental rights (Article 67(1)) and ‘ensur[ing] a high level of security through 
measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia’ (Article 67(3)) – cut across the internal and 
external strands of the AFSJ.  
28 Economic and social cohesion policy provides another example; see e.g. AG Sharpston in Case C-436/15 
Alytaus regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, EU:C:2017:33, fn3 of the Opinion: ‘[i]n essence EU policy on 
economic and social cohesion aims in particular to reduce disparities between the levels of development 
across the territory of the European Union and to address “the backwardness of the least favoured regions”. 
See, in that regard, Article 174 TFEU’. 
29 See further, Protocol No 19 on the integration of the Schengen Acquis. With respect to the AFSJ more 
generally, see Protocol No 21 on the position of the UK and Ireland and Protocol No 22 on the position of 
Denmark. 
30 Note also the lower threshold for review of draft legislative acts based on Article 76 TFEU with respect to 
subsidiarity opinions submitted by national parliaments (a quarter rather than a third); see Article 7(2) of 
Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  
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and extraterritoriality.31 Territoriality relates to which law applies and who has the authority to make32 
as well as to enforce it. For example, to protect intellectual property rights, ‘the principle of 
territoriality, in trade mark law, entails that it is the law of the State – or of the union of States – where 
protection of a trade mark is sought which determines the conditions of that protection … [T]he 
principle of territoriality also entails that the court of a State or of a union of States has jurisdiction (in 
whole or in part) in respect of acts of infringement committed or threatened within the territory of 
that State or that union of States, to the exclusion of third States’.33 Determining the reach of EU law 
relates (1) to defining its scope of application,34 for the purposes of which demarcation of the ‘customs 
territory’ of the Union offers a good example;35 (2) to determining the effects of EU measures in third 
countries, which has generated an extensive line of case law on the legitimacy of EU measures 
effecting the freezing of funds, for example;36 and (3) to establishing the territorial jurisdiction of EU 
actors, such as that of the Commission to enforce EU competition rules.37  
Three points have particular resonance for the consideration of Union territory as legal place 
and as common place explored in this paper. First, where EU legislation has been adopted, the Court 
emphasises the need for uniform interpretation of ‘autonomous concepts’ of EU law so that a uniform 
 
31 Though more basic impressions of ‘territory’ can also be found in EU law: for example, Article 50 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides that ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in 
criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within 
the Union in accordance with the law’. See e.g. Joined Cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-
251/01 and T-252/01, Tokai Carbon, EU:T:2004:118, para. 137; and AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-234/17 
XC and Others, EU:C:2018:391, para. 38 of the Opinion.  
32 In Opinion 2/15, for example, AG Sharpston characterised the TFEU provisions that determine the division of 
competences as addressing: ‘who is competent to act within the territory of the European Union: the 
European Union or the Member States?’ (EU:C:2016:992, para. 57 of the Opinion). 
33 Case T-61/16 Coca-Cola v EUIPO - Mitico (Master), EU:T:2017:877, para. 81. 
34 For example, to delimit the scope of application of directly applicable EU regulations (e.g. recital (s) of 
Council Regulation 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (2012 OJ L88/1) defines Union 
territory as ‘the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid 
down in the Treaty, including their airspace’, while Article 49 determines that the Regulation applies ‘(a) within 
the territory of the Union, including its airspace; (b) on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction 
of a Member State; (c) to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a 
Member State; (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is 
incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State; (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect 
of any business done in whole or in part within the Union’).  
35 See e.g. Case C-409/14 Schenker, EU:C:2016:643 (entry into the customs territory of the Union); Case C-
267/16 Buhagiar, EU:C:2018:26 (exclusion of Gibraltar from the customs territory of the Union); and Case C-
643/17 Suez II, EU:C:2019:179 (determination of ‘Union status’ for goods under the Customs Code).  
36 See e.g. Case T-362/04 Minin, EU:T: 2007:25, esp. paras 106-108 (financial sanctions based on conduct that 
produces effects exclusively outside the Union). See further, Case T-256/07 People’s Mojahedin Organization 
of Iran v Council, EU:T:2008:461, para. 148; Case T-383/11 Makhlouf, EU:T:2013:431, paras 99-100; and Joined 
Cases T-156/13 and T-373/14 Petro Suisse Intertrade, EU:T:2015:646, para. 128.  
37 See e.g. Case T-91/11 InnoLux Corp, EU:T:2014:92, paras 56-75; Case C-413/14 P Intel v Commission, 
EU:C:2017:632, esp. paras 40-50.  
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level of protection is ensured throughout the territory of the Union.38 Second, for activity undertaken 
outside the territory of the Union, EU law can still be relevant where a ‘sufficiently close’ connection 
or link to the Union can be established. For the free movement of persons, Boukhalfa is the archetypal 
example, demonstrating that EU law does not have ‘a purely geographical scope’.39 Confirming the 
approach taken in previous case law,40 the Court ruled that ‘provisions of [Union] law may apply to 
professional activities pursued outside [Union] territory as long as the employment relationship 
retains a sufficiently close link with the [Union]’.41 At a more general level, the Court considered that 
while what is now Article 52(1) does define ‘the geographical application of the Treaty’, it does not 
‘preclude [Union] rules from having effects outside the territory of the [Union]’.42 As a result, ‘the 
geographical dimension of the [Union] legal system is more than the sum of the territories of the 
Member States, which it undoubtedly includes’.43 
 Third, the relevance of EU law for actions that have effects outside the territory of the Union 
– for situations where there are ‘elements of extra-territoriality’44 – is deeply connected to the 
objectives and values that the Union pursues. For example, in Air Transport Association of America, 
having first stated that ‘the European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a 
commercial activity, in this instance air transport, to be carried out in the territory of the European 
Union only on condition that operators comply with the criteria that have been established by the 
European Union and are designed to fulfil the environmental protection objectives which it has set for 
itself, in particular where those objectives follow on from an international agreement to which the 
European Union is a signatory’, the Court then stated that ‘the fact that, in the context of applying 
European Union environmental legislation, certain matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea 
or land territory of the Member States originate in an event which occurs partly outside that territory 
is not such as to call into question, in the light of the principles of customary international law capable 
of being relied upon in the main proceedings, the full applicability of European Union law in that 
 
38 See e.g. Case C-34/10 Brüstle, EU:C:2011:669, para. 26 (definition of human embryo); Case C-226/15 P Apple 
and Pear Australia and Star Fruits Diffusion v EUIPO, EU:C:2016:582, para. 49 (uniform protection of EU 
trademarks); Case C-149/15 Wathelet, EU:C:2016:840, para. 29 (definition of seller for consumer goods). 
39 AG Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1995:381, para. 27 of the Opinion.  
40 E.g. Case C-60/93 Aldewereld, EU:C:1994:271, para. 14. 
41 Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1996:174, para. 15; satisfied in this case through the existence of ‘a 
sufficiently close link between the employment relationship, on the one hand, and the law of a Member State 
and thus the relevant rules of [Union] law, on the other’ (ibid) and not called into question by the fact that the 
plaintiff resided and performed her contract of employment in a third country (paras 20-21). Confirmed in e.g. 
Case C-544/11 Petersen, EU:C:2013:124, para. 41. 
42 Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1996:174, para. 14 (emphasis added).  
43 AG Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1995:381, para. 32 of the Opinion (emphasis added). The EEA is 
strong example of Union rules ‘having effects outside the territory of the Union’, its institutional as well as 
substantive dimensions being shaped by the requirements of EU law. 
44 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516, para. 
55 of the Opinion. 
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territory’.45 Similarly, in El Dakkak and Intercontinental, the Court recalled a range of underpinning 
objectives and values to detach presence in the Union territory from the act of crossing an external 
border in order to rationalise a broad reading of Regulation 1889/2005. On that basis, it held that 
obligations flowing from EU law reached into the international transit areas of airports located in the 
territory of the Union.46 Importantly, the responsibility of the Member States as the enforcers of EU 
legal obligations on their own territories was also highlighted, returned to in Section IV.A below.47  
Finally, in the context of the territory of the Union as a common place, how do the objectives 
and values of the Union relate to the objectives and values of its Member States? Where, in other 
words, is the commonality in this respect? In Arcelor, Advocate General Poiares Maduro rooted the 
values of the Union in ‘the constitutional principles common to the Member States, as reiterated in 
[Article 6(3) TEU]’, a link that generates ‘analogous European constitutional values’.48 Similarly, for 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ‘[t]he construction of a Europe without borders, with its 
corollary of the approximation of the various national legal systems, including the criminal systems, 
presupposes that the States involved will be guided by the same values’.49 However, engaging with 
the territory of the Union in its more autonomous and composite senses must also suggest that there 
are distinctly ‘Union’ values too, which can then be linked more autonomously to Union citizenship –  
or at least values with a distinctly Union meaning or content. Thinking again about the AFSJ, for 
example, consider the emphases used by Advocate General Kokott in her statement that ‘[i]t is the 
Union that provides its citizens with such an area and it is the Union that constitutes that area (Article 
67(1) TFEU), with the emphasis on an area without internal frontiers (Article 3(2) TEU and 67(2) 
TFEU)’.50 At the same time, she acknowledged that ‘[t]here may certainly be cases where cooperation 
with a third State is also capable of helping to achieve the objectives of the area of freedom, security 
and justice within the Union (see the second variant of Article 216(1) TFEU) and thus of giving that 
area a genuine “external dimension”’.51  
 
45 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, EU:C:2011:864, para. 128 (emphasis added). For 
extensive analysis of the ‘global reach’ of EU legislation, see Scott, n20 above. Conversely, on external norms 
coming ‘into’ EU measures, see E Fahey, ‘Joining the Dots: External Norms, AFSJ Directives and the EU’s Role in 
the Global Legal Order’ (2016) 41 EL Rev 105. 
46 Case C-17/16 El Dakkak and Intercontinental, EU:C:2017:341, paras 28-38; Regulation 1889/2005 on controls 
of cash entering or leaving the Community, 2005 OJ L309/9. 
47 Case C-17/16 El Dakkak and Intercontinental, EU:C:2017:341, para. 42. 
48 AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-127/07 Arcelor, EU:C:2008:292, para. 15 of the Opinion.  
49 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2002:516, para. 
55 of the Opinion. 
50 AG Kokott in Case C-263/14 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2015:729, para. 63 of the Opinion (emphasis in 
original). 
51 Ibid para. 65 of the Opinion; continuing that ‘[e]xamples are the inclusion of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland in the Schengen area or the Lugano Convention, which includes some of those States in 
certain aspects of judicial cooperation in civil matters. However, external action has no evident repercussions 
on the area within the Union in the case of cooperation like that with Tanzania, for which the contested 
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Alongside the constitutional traditions of the Member States, Article 6(3) TEU also refers to 
the ECHR in connection with the fundamental rights that constitute general principles of EU law. For 
the values of the Union more generally, Article 2 TEU establishes that ‘[t]he Union is founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’, while acknowledging too that 
‘[t]hese values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’. There is therefore an 
interrelationship between national, Union and international values as well as the potential for 
distinctive understandings52 of a particular value at any given level. The testing of national rule of law 
standards against the Union standard of the ‘same’ value in various threads of litigation involving 
Poland at the present time exemplifies the point;53 that case law is returned to in Section IV.B below. 
 
B. Territory and Union citizenship   
 
Although Boukhalfa concerned the free movement of workers, Advocate General Léger did reflect on 
the then recently created status of Union citizenship. In particular, he considered that through the 
obligation ‘to treat the nationals of all the Member States in the same way as those of the State 
concerned’, the Treaty’s free movement provisions ‘meet the more general aim of promoting a feeling 
of belonging to a common entity enshrined in the frequently used phrase “people’s Europe”, and in 
the “citizenship of the Union”’; asking then what ‘the effects of such a feeling of belonging or such 
citizenship [would be] if they disappeared once the geographical borders of the Union were crossed’.54 
That reflection evokes the impulse both to keep Union business within the territory of the Union and 
to insinuate EU law where certain effects materialise beyond its borders. Union citizenship adds a 
further dimension to the resulting ‘feeling of belonging’ to a common place. However, in EU citizenship 
 
decision and the disputed agreement lay the legal foundations’. For another example of the particular Union 
interest in ‘events which take place in a country bordering the European Union’, which ‘are capable of 
justifying measures designed to protect essential European Union security interests and to maintain peace and 
international security’, see Case C-72/15 Rosneft, EU:C:2017:236, para. 112 (concerning the EU-Russia 
Partnership Agreement in the context of Ukraine). 
52 There is also some potential for distinctive application but, for an EU Member State, that potential is limited 
by the requirements of primacy when a situation falls within the scope of EU law; see esp. Case C-399/11 
Melloni, EU:C:2013:107. 
53 Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), EU:C:2019:531; Case C-216/18 PPU 
(Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (LM), EU:C:2018:586. 
54 AG Léger in Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa, EU:C:1995:381, para. 31 of the Opinion (emphasis added). 
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law, nationality is the dominant coordinate. It is not surprising then that, before the judgment in Ruiz 
Zambrano, there were only limited and scattered references to the concept of territory.55 
 In the Treaty provisions that establish Union citizenship and associated rights, the main 
explicit references to ‘territory’ are to the territory of the Member States regarding the scope of 
application of the right to move and reside freely (Articles 20(2) and 21(1) TFEU). Similarly, Directive 
2004/38, which regulates the exercise of the right to move and reside, refers only to the territory ‘of 
the Member States’ or ‘of the host Member State’.56 However, there is also an explicitly extraterritorial 
dimension in the guarantee that ‘[e]very citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of 
that State’ (Article 23 TFEU).57 Additionally, legislation that establishes ‘the procedures and conditions 
required for a citizens’ initiative within the meaning of Article 11 [TEU]’58 (Article 24 TFEU) reflects a 
transnational understanding of Union territory through the validity thresholds that it puts in place.59 
Territory rarely featured in EU citizenship case law. However, in McCarthy II, the Court continued a 
process of distancing itself from its previous, State territory-oriented ruling in Akrich to find that 
‘pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2004/38, a person who is a family member of a Union citizen…is not 
subject to the requirement to obtain a visa or an equivalent requirement in order to be able to enter 
the territory of that Union citizen’s Member State of origin’.60 Instead, ‘the Member States are, in 
 
55 On the salience of territory for citizenship of a state, of the Union and for emerging forms of citizenship 
decoupled from polities, see N Walker ‘The Place of Territory in Citizenship’ in A Shachar, R Bauböck, I 
Bloemraad and M Vink (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (OUP, 2017) 553. 
56 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ L158/77. 
57 See Directive 2015/637/EU on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection 
for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries, 2015 OJ L106/1. See further, M Moraru, ‘An Analysis 
of the Consular Protection Directive: Are EU Citizens Now Better Protected in the World?’ (2019) 56 CML Rev 
417; P Vigni, ‘The Right of EU Citizens to Diplomatic and Consular Protection: A Step Towards Recognition of 
EU Citizenship in Third Countries?’ in Kochenov (ed.), n21 above, 584. 
58 Article 11(4) TEU provides: ‘[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of 
Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its 
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is 
required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. The procedures and conditions required for such a 
citizens’ initiative shall be determined in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 [TFEU]’. 
59 Regulation 211/2011/EU on the citizens’ initiative, 2011 OJ L65/1; see especially, Article 7 on the minimum 
number of signatories per Member State, explained in recital 5 on the premise of ‘ensur[ing] that a citizens’ 
initiative is representative of a Union interest’. 
OJ L 65, 11.3.2011, p. 1 
60 Case C-202/13 McCarthy II, EU:C:2014:2450, paras 41-42. In Akrich, the Court ruled that ‘the national of a 
non-Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen of the Union, must be lawfully resident in a Member State 
when he moves to another Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated’ (Case 
C-109/01 Akrich, EU:C:2003:491, para. 50). It ‘reconsidered’ that approach in Case C-127/08 Metock and 
Others, EU:C:2008:449, on the basis that no such requirement was added to Directive 2004/38, which had 
been adopted in the period between Akrich and Metock. 
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principle, required to recognise a residence card issued under Article 10 of Directive 2004/38, for the 
purposes of entry into their territory without a visa’.61 That decision transforms entry to the territory 
of a Member State into entry to the territory of the Union – to the territory of Union citizenship.62  
However, territorial splintering is still evident in other aspects of Union citizenship’s legal 
framework. For example, Azoulai observes that a ‘somewhat unfortunate consequence’ of the 
‘territorial differentiation’ realised through Article 355 TFEU is that ‘the citizens of these special 
territories, who have the status of Union citizens by virtue of their nationality, may be deprived of the 
enjoyment of EU citizenship rights, whereas Union citizens from the Member States’ “common” 
territory may be deprived of the enjoyment of free movement rights in these special territories’.63 It 
is also clear that most disputes in EU citizenship law concern the territory of one i.e. ‘host’ State, 
reflecting in essence a bilateral relationship between that State and the national of another State, 
albeit one that is mediated by supranational law where relevant. Azoulai has criticised what he calls 
the resulting ‘transnational paradigm of EU citizenship based on Member State territoriality’ and 
argued that ‘[a] proper citizenship regime would constitute not only a right to free movement, but 
also a right to enjoy the community of values anywhere within the European Union, regardless of 
territory. It would allow people to live, at least partially, in material, social and moral conditions which 
reflect a wide-reaching European society’.64 In one sense, the judgment in Coman realised that vision. 
There, the Court attributed Union-wide meaning to the concept of ‘spouse’ for the purposes of 
Directive 2004/38 and determined that ‘Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the 
competent authorities of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national from refusing to 
grant that third-country national a right of residence in the territory of that Member State on the 
 
61 Case C-202/13 McCarthy II, EU:C:2014:2450, para. 62. 
62 Underlined by the Court’s comment in Akrich that Regulation 1612/68 was actually ‘silent as to the rights of 
a national of a non-Member State, who is the spouse of a citizen of the Union, in regard to access to the 
territory of the [Union]’ (Case C-109/01 Akrich, EU:C:2003:491, para. 49; Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom 
of movement for workers within the Community, 1968 OJ L257/13).  
63 Azoulai, n21 above, 179 (emphasis added); also pointing out that in Eman and Sevinger [Case C-300/04, 
EU:C:2006:545, paras 55-58], ‘the Court made clear that EU citizens residing in the non-European territory of 
Aruba may be deprived of the right to participate in the European Parliament elections as long as this complies 
with the general principle of non-discrimination enshrined in EU law. Conversely, on the possibility for 
overseas countries and territories to introduce restrictions on free movement, reference is made to Council 
Decision 2013/755/EU on the association of overseas countries and territories with the European Union, OJ 
2013 L344/1’. 
64 Azoulai, n21 above, 180 (emphasis added). In particular, he argues that ‘EU law seems incapable of resisting 
the re-territorialisation of free movement policies advocated, sometimes successfully, by the governments of 
certain Member States in the context of a significant decrease in mutual trust and harmony in the Union, 
particularly in times of economic and political crisis. As a result, the legal regime which governs EU citizenship 
seems to be doomed to produce individual emancipation and empowerment whilst at the same time 
producing alienation and frustration’ (ibid 180-181). See similarly, C Raucea, ‘European Citizenship and the 
Right to Reside: “No One on the Outside has a Right to be Inside?’” (2016) 22 ELJ 470, esp. 482. On the 
transnational and supranational dimensions of Union citizenship, see further, Coutts, n4 above.  
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ground that the law of that Member State does not recognise marriage between persons of the same 
sex’.65 The facts in Coman concern a right to reside in one Member State territory; but the construct 
of the Union as a legal place on its own terms had to be engaged to make that happen. Similarly, 
certain values that are clearly not ‘common’ to all of the Member States at a local regulatory level 
nevertheless had to be recognised at that level because they are Union values: the commonality of 
the State’s membership of that legal place therefore transcending local differences.  
In these cases, Azoulai suggests that ‘[w]hat EU law does is to facilitate the possibility of 
movement from one Member State territory to another’ and that ‘[s]uch mobility requires the 
construction of a space which ties together all Member States territories. This inter-space is the point 
of view from which the situation of individuals can be assessed. It is no more than a fictional space 
which allows individuals to maintain their legal status while passing from one state territory to the 
other’.66 However, he argues that the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano ‘represent[s] a real and discernible 
paradigm shift in the shape of the concept of the “territory of the Union”’.67 His research questions 
connect to examining the tensions between the introduction of that concept in Ruiz Zambrano and 
the evolution of EU citizenship law more generally along a transnational, movement-oriented 
trajectory. He asks: ‘how are we going to reconcile the traditional jurisprudence which takes a 
transnational view of EU citizenship with the emergence of the “transcendental” conception of 
citizenship as presented in Ruiz Zambrano? How and under which circumstances does EU law reach 
the point of complete “metaphorization” of the concept of Union territory? Is this process sustainable, 
and can we build upon it to shift the discourse on Union citizenship?’68  
Here, the three narratives presented, which also proceed from Ruiz Zambrano as the starting 
point of significant legal change, pursue a more territory-focused than citizen-focused analysis, at least 
in the first instance. The objective is to unpick how the privileging of different interests can produce 
strikingly different outcomes, leading then to consideration of how the parallel narratives that have 
developed in the case law to date – foundational, protective and systemic – might be integrated; to 






65 Case C-673/16 Coman, EU:C:2018:385, para. 51.  
66 Azoulai, n21 above, 184 (emphasis added). 
67 Ibid 181. 
68 Ibid 182. 
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III. The foundational narrative: Union citizenship and the ‘intrinsic connection’ to freedom 
of movement and residence  
 
Achieving the condition of residence security is a powerful theme in EU citizenship law, but it almost 
always concerns security of residence for a Member State national (and/or their family members) in 
the territory of another Member State.69 In contrast, the ruling in Ruiz Zambrano opened up a novel, 
and more controversial, conception of residence security with reference to the territory of the Union 
per se. It is not so much, then, that the Court ‘reversed’ its longstanding case law on purely internal 
situations. It is more that, by attributing legal significance to the construct of Union territory, the Court 
transcended that case law altogether. The reasoning proceeded in four steps. First, the Court invoked 
the idea of Union citizenship as ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.70 Second, 
it held that ‘[i]n those circumstances, Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the 
effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’.71 Engaging Article 20, not 21, TFEU seemed 
initially to suggest that the right to move and reside was not relevant in this case: the Union citizens 
in question were minor children of Belgian nationality who had always lived in Belgium i.e. no free 
movement rights had been exercised. The use of ‘substance of rights’ language suggested a doctrine 
drawn more from Union citizenship as a status than from rights already expressly conferred by the 
Treaty or provided for in secondary law. Furthermore, the Court referred to its judgment in Rottmann, 
which had determined that decisions taken at national level about the withdrawal of Member State 
nationality must be taken in compliance with the principle of proportionality when they lead in 
consequence to the loss of Union citizenship.72  
Third, the Court held that ‘[a] refusal to grant a right of residence to a third country national 
with dependent minor children in the Member State where those children are nationals and reside, 
and also a refusal to grant such a person a work permit, has such an effect’.73 This is because, fourth, 
‘[i]t must be assumed that such a refusal would lead to a situation where those children, citizens of 
 
69 See further, L Mancano, The European Union and Deprivation of Liberty: A Legislative and Judicial Analysis 
from the Perspective of the Individual (Hart Publishing, 2019) 222. 
70 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 41. 
71 Ibid para. 42.  
72 Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104. In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court referred to para. 42 of Rottmann, 
where it had established that ‘the situation of a citizen of the Union who, like the applicant in the main 
proceedings, is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one 
Member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally 
possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article [20 TFEU] and the rights 
attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law’ 
(emphasis added). 
73 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 43 (emphasis added).  
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the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order to accompany their parents. 
Similarly, if a work permit were not granted to such a person, he would risk not having sufficient 
resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also result in the children, citizens of the 
Union, having to leave the territory of the Union. In those circumstances, those citizens of the Union 
would, in fact, be unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their 
status as citizens of the Union’.74 In subsequent judgments, the Court explained and confronted the 
implications of Ruiz Zambrano i.e. that it had constructed a ‘right to stay within the territory of the 
European Union’.75 Three (related) points from that case law are highlighted here:76 first, the 
exceptional nature of rights based on Article 20 TFEU and the explanatory ‘intrinsic connection’ to 
freedom of movement drawn in that respect; second, the requirement and meaning of a relationship 
of dependency; and, third, the limits that can be placed on Article 20 TFEU residence rights.  
First, residence rights based on Article 20 TFEU arise only in ‘very specific situations in which, 
despite the fact that the secondary law on the right of residence of third-country nationals does not 
apply and the Union citizen concerned has not made use of his freedom of movement, a right of 
residence exceptionally cannot, without undermining the effectiveness of the Union citizenship that 
citizen enjoys, be refused to a third-country national who is a family member of his if, as a 
consequence of refusal, that citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European 
Union altogether’.77 While the paring back of the genuine enjoyment test that results can be criticised 
for consequential paring back of the scope of Union citizenship rights,78 it is, at the same time, 
 
74 Ibid para. 44 (emphasis added). 
75 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 42; see also, para. 44. Davies recalls the residence 
expectations of citizenship in a general sense in this context, suggesting that ‘it is hardly a strange view of 
citizenship to say that citizens should enjoy the right to live in the territory of which they are citizens. Member 
States may not all have realised that Union citizenship is to be understood as a form of citizenship, and not 
merely a relabeling of the migratory status quo, but the name should perhaps have given them a hint, and the 
Court has certainly been warning them for long enough’ (G Davies, ‘The Right to Stay at Home: A Basis for 
Expanding European Family Rights’ in Kochenov (ed.), n21 above, 468, 473. 
76 For general discussion of Ruiz Zambrano and subsequent case law, see e.g. H Kroeze, ‘The Substance of 
Rights: New Pieces of the Ruiz Zambrano Puzzle’ (2019) 44 EL Rev 238; PJ Neuvonen, ‘EU Citizenship and Its 
“Very Specific” Essence: Rendón Marin and CS’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 1201; N Nic Shuibhne, ‘(Some of) The Kids 
Are All Right’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 349. 
77 Case C-40/11 Iida, EU:C:2012:691, para. 71 (emphasis added); confirmed in e.g. Case C-87/12 Ymeraga, 
EU:C:2013:291, para. 36 and Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:575, para. 74. A Union citizen can of 
course choose to leave the territory of the Union but should not be forced to do so by a decision implementing 
national law, subject to the limits discussed further below. In other words, Union citizenship ‘cannot amount 
to putting [Member State nationals] “under house arrest” in the territory of the European Union’ (AG Bot in 
Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:595, para. 41 of the Opinion). 
78 See e.g. S Reynolds, ‘Exploring the “Intrinsic Connection” between Free Movement and the Genuine 
Enjoyment Test: Reflections on EU Citizenship after Iida’ (2013) 38 EL Rev 376, 388-391. 
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reflective of a legal order premised on conferred competences.79 More generally, the value of 
reframing this kind of either/or dilemma is returned to in Section IV.C below.  
The Court has also explained that the ‘common element’ in Ruiz Zambrano situations is that 
‘although they are governed by legislation which falls a priori within the competence of the Member 
States, namely legislation on the right of entry and stay of third-country nationals outside the scope 
of Directives 2003/109 and 2004/38,80 they none the less have an intrinsic connection with the 
freedom of movement of a Union citizen which prevents the right of entry and residence from being 
refused to those nationals in the Member State of residence of that citizen, in order not to interfere 
with that freedom’.81 The thread of ‘intrinsic connection’ reasoning was, at most, implicit in the Ruiz 
Zambrano judgment; though it was referenced directly by Advocate General Sharpston.82 Advocate 
General Sharpston also acknowledged another dimension that the Court overlooked: that ‘[i]t is of 
course theoretically possible that another Member State might be prepared to take the family’.83 The 
option (or obligation?) to move to another State – which necessarily means that there is then no 
forced departure from the territory of the Union – featured more prominently in later case law.84 
However, it exemplifies the limited ‘transnational paradigm of EU citizenship based on Member State 
 
79 See e.g. S Adam and P van Elsuwege, ‘Citizenship Rights and the Federal Balance between the European 
Union and its Member States: Comment on Dereci’ (2012) 37 EL Rev 176, esp. 182; K Lenaerts and JA 
Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears’ in Kochenov (ed.), n21 above, 751, 771-773. 
80 In NA, Court referred to the fact that ‘the person concerned does not qualify for a right of residence in that 
Member State under European Union secondary law’ as ‘[t]he first condition on which the possibility of 
claiming a right of residence in the host Member State under Article 20 TFEU depends’ (Case C-115/15 NA, 
EU:C:2016:487, para. 74; Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents (2003 OJ L16/44). Similarly, Reynolds observes ‘a “last resort” approach, requiring EU citizens to 
access EU law through other means’ (n78 above, 386). 
81 Case C-40/11 Iida, EU:C:2012:691, para. 72 (emphasis added); confirmed in e.g. Case C-304/14 CS, 
EU:C:2016:674, para. 3 and Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 64. 
82 AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2010:560, esp. para. 99 of the Opinion: ‘[g]iven their age 
… his children will have to leave with him. They will be unable to exercise their right to move and reside within 
the territory of the European Union. The parallels with Rottmann are obvious. Dr Rottmann’s rights as a citizen 
of the Union were under serious threat because revocation of his naturalisation in Germany would leave him 
unable to exercise those rights ratione personae. Here, Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children face a not dissimilar 
threat to their rights ratione loci. They need to be able to remain physically present within the territory of the 
European Union in order to move between Member States or reside in any Member State’ (emphasis added). 
See further, paras 100-103 of the Opinion.  
83 Ibid fn76 of the Opinion (emphasis added). 
84 See esp. Case C-86/12 Alokpa and Moudoulou, EU:C:2013:645, paras 32-35. Thus, ‘while European 
citizenship status can shield individuals from being deported from the territory of the Union, it cannot 
completely shield individuals from the risk of “internal” deportations’ (Raucea, n64 above, 481). That position 
has been much criticised; see e.g. D Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient 
Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text’ (2012) 37 EL Rev 369, 393 (‘[s]ince the Treaties do not connect 
the enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship rights with movement or limit EU citizenship rights to the 
right not to leave the territory of the Union, the rights paradigm should not be artificially connected to 
movement, which the Court seems to be suggesting in McCarthy or Dereci. It is quite sensible to expect that 
rights be sufficiently protected without taking a bus’).    
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territoriality’ criticised above by Azoulai.85 In a welcome development, the Court now engages more 
deeply with the practical and not just theoretical circumstances of affected Union citizens:86 ‘[i]n other 
words, the option available to a third country national and his/her Union citizen children of moving to 
the Member State of which those children are nationals cannot exist only in the abstract’.87  
For example, in Rendón Marín, the Court confirmed that ‘it is for the referring court to check 
whether, in the light of all the circumstances of the main proceedings, Mr Rendón Marín, as the parent 
who is the sole carer of his children, may in fact enjoy the derived right to go with them to Poland and 
reside with them there, so that a refusal of the Spanish authorities to grant him a right of residence 
would not result in his children being obliged to leave the territory of the European Union as a 
whole’.88 However, noting the claimant’s submissions at the hearing that ‘he maintains no ties with 
the family of his daughter’s mother, who, according to him, does not reside in Poland, and that neither 
he nor his children know the Polish language’, the Court did suggest that ‘it seems to be clear from 
the information before the Court that the situation at issue in the main proceedings is capable of 
resulting, for Mr Rendón Marin’s children, in their being deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights which the status of Union citizen confers upon them’.89 In other words, the 
factual circumstances in a given case ‘may defeat the theoretical possibility of not having to leave the 
territory of the European Union altogether’.90 The same logic, framed by Articles 7 and 24 of the 
Charter, applies to evaluating the reality of a minor Union citizen’s relationship with both of his or her 
parents: ‘the fact that the other parent, a Union citizen, is actually able and willing to assume sole 
responsibility for the primary day-to-day care of the child is a relevant factor, but it is not in itself a 
sufficient ground for a conclusion that there is not, between the third-country national parent and the 
child, such a relationship of dependency that the child would be compelled to leave the territory of 
the European Union if a right of residence were refused to that third-country national’.91 In Chavez-
 
85 See further, AG Mengozzi in Case C-256/11 Dereci, EU:C:2011:626, paras 43-44 of the View, acknowledging 
the ‘paradox’ that ‘in order to be able actually to enjoy a family life within the territory of the Union, the Union 
citizens concerned have to exercise one of the freedoms of movement laid down in the TFEU’ (emphasis in 
original). The case law further encourages this ‘paradox’ in the sense that deliberately exercising free 
movement and residence rights for the purpose of creating rights in a home State following the Union citizen’s 
return there is not an abuse of free movement (see e.g. Case C-109/01 Akrich, EU:C:2003:491, paras 55-57). 
86 Already evident in the questions raised by AG Mengozzi in Case C-256/11 Dereci, EU:C:2011:626, paras 47-
48 of the View. 
87 AG Wathelet in Case C-115/15 NA, EU:C:2016:259, para. 114 of the Opinion. 
88 Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:575, para. 79.  
89 Ibid para. 80. 
90 AG Wathelet in Case C-115/15 NA, EU:C:2016:259, para. 109 of the Opinion.  
91 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 71; the Court continued by advising that ‘’[i]n reaching 
such a conclusion, account must be taken, in the best interests of the child concerned, of all the specific 
circumstances, including the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional development, the extent of his 
emotional ties both to the Union citizen parent and to the third-country national parent, and the risks which 
separation from the latter might entail for that child’s equilibrium’ (ibid). On the burden of proof in such cases, 
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Vilchez, the Court restated the ‘intrinsic connection’ explanation but, as noted, emphasised more 
strongly the right to stay within the territory of the Union.92 The right to stay conjures a link between 
Union citizenship and finding a home – cushioned by the security that this term implies – within Union 
territory. The sense that Ruiz Zambrano was always concerned with something more than 
preservation of free movement per se is returned to below; but the nature of Union territory as a 
specific legal place and specific common place is already discernible.  
Second, to engender a right to stay within the territory of the Union, the relationship between 
the Union citizen and their third country national family member(s) must be defined by dependency.93 
Dependency is an expression of proportionality. It provides a framework through which it can be 
determined whether restricting the rights of Union citizens is ‘acceptable or not in the specific 
circumstances of the situations at issue’.94 Dependency is not determined by whether a Union citizen 
lives with the person for whom a right to reside is sought or by a blood relationship,95 though 
arrangements concerning the custody or primary care of minor children may be relevant.96 What is 
essential is that legal, financial or emotional dependency must be demonstrated;97  since that is what 
‘would lead to the Union citizen being obliged, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member 
State of which he is a national but also that of the European Union as a whole’.98 For the Court, ‘unlike 
minors and a fortiori minors who are young children…an adult is, as a general rule, capable of living 
an independent existence apart from the members of his family’, so that ‘identification of a 
relationship between two adult members of the same family as a relationship of dependency, capable 
of giving rise to a derived right of residence under Article 20 TFEU, is conceivable only in exceptional 
cases, where, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, there could be no form of separation of 
the individual concerned from the member of his family on whom he is dependent’.99 Thus while a 
 
see paras 74-78. For Davies, ‘in some sense there are always alternatives, so that to understand dependency in 
terms of a complete lack of alternatives is to empty it of meaning’ (n75 above, 477). 
92 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, esp. paras 42, 44 and 65. 
93 See e.g. Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:776, para. 50. See further, AG Bot in the 
same case (EU:C:2012:595, para. 44 of the Opinion): ‘[t]he reasons linked to the departure of the citizen of the 
Union from its territory are therefore particularly limited in the case-law of the Court. They concern situations 
in which the Union citizen has no other choice but to follow the person concerned, whose right of residence has 
been refused, because he is in that person’s care and thus entirely dependent on that person to ensure his 
maintenance and provide for his own needs’ (emphasis added). 
94 AG Szpunar in Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2016:659, para. 93 of the Opinion.  
95 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:776, paras 54-55. 
96 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 68; Case C-82/16 KA, EU:C:2018:308, para. 71. 
97 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:776, paras 51 and 56; Case C-133/15 Chavez-
Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 68. 
98 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, EU:C:2012:776, paras 54-56; Case C-82/16 KA, EU:C:2018:308, 
para. 73. 
99 Case C-82/16 KA, EU:C:2018:308, para. 65; ruling out ‘dependency of any kind’ in that case for a ‘lawful 
cohabitant’ (para. 69). 
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theoretical prospect remains that dependency might be recognised in any relationship, the Ruiz 
Zambrano case law has particular impact and import for protecting the rights of children.100  
The intersection of the dependency requirement and the circumstances of a Union citizen’s 
network of relationships brings us back to the relevance of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which ensures respect for private and family life. The Court’s attempt to address this question 
in Dereci generated the regrettably dismissive statement that ‘the mere fact that it might appear 
desirable to a national of a Member State, for economic reasons or in order to keep his family together 
in the territory of the Union, for the members of his family who do not have the nationality of a 
Member State to be able to reside with him in the territory of the Union, is not sufficient in itself to 
support the view that the Union citizen will be forced to leave Union territory if such a right is not 
granted’.101 Substantively, this limitation connects back to the strict understanding of dependency 
applied in the case law, without which ‘the existence of a family link, whether natural or legal, between 
the minor Union citizen and his third-country national parent cannot be sufficient ground to justify 
the grant, under Article 20 TFEU, of a derived right of residence to that parent in the territory of the 
Member State of which the minor child is a national’.102 In other words, ‘[t]he mere possibility of losing 
the opportunity to quietly live with one’s family does not trigger protection under EU law’.103  
The Court acknowledged that ‘[t]hat finding is, admittedly, without prejudice to the question 
whether, on the basis of other criteria, inter alia, by virtue of the right to the protection of family life, 
a right of residence cannot be refused’ but stressed that ‘that question must be tackled in the 
framework of the provisions on the protection of fundamental rights which are applicable in each 
case’.104 In that respect, the Court was initially reluctant to engage the Charter to determine whether 
the circumstances of a case generated the kind of exceptional situation required by Article 20 TFEU.105 
But it has loosened that resistance more recently,106 especially where Article 7 further connects to 
protecting the best interests of the child under Article 24 of the Charter.107 Here, we see common 
values that underpin the Union territory as a legal place coming gradually to the fore of the Court’s 
decision-making in connection with its shaping of the right of Union citizens to stay there.  
 
100 For further discussion, see H van Eijken and P Phoa, ‘The Scope of Article 20 TFEU Clarified in Chavez-
Vilchez: Are the Fundamental Rights of Minor Citizens Coming of Age?’ (2018) 43 EL Rev 949. 
101 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others, EU:C:2011:734, para. 68. 
102 Case C-82/16 KA, EU:C:2018:308, para. 75 (emphasis added). 
103 Azoulai, n21 above, 196. 
104 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others, EU:C:2011:734, para. 69. 
105 See e.g. Case C-87/12 Ymeraga, EU:C:2013:291, paras 42-43. 
106 See esp. Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, EU:C:2017:354, para. 70. 
107 The change in the Court’s approach surely responds to powerful interventions from Advocates General 
Sharpston (Case C-456/12 O; Case C-457/12 S and G, EU:C:2013:837, paras 60-63 of the joint Opinion), Szpunar 
(Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín; Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:75, paras 119-120 of the joint Opinion) and 
Wathelet (Case C-115/15 NA, EU:C:2016:259, paras 120-126 of the Opinion). 
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However, third, the right to stay within the territory of the Union is not unlimited. The right 
to reside in another Member State can be restricted under EU law, but that framework presumes that 
a Union citizen can return to their home State i.e. can remain within the territory of the Union. 
Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that ‘Article 20 TFEU does not affect the possibility of Member 
States relying on an exception linked, in particular, to upholding the requirements of public policy and 
safeguarding public security’.108 In line with the approach taken to loss of Union citizenship in 
Rottmann, proportionality plays a critical role here once again. In that light, where forced departure 
of a Union citizen from the territory of the Union is being contemplated on public policy or public 
security grounds, national authorities ‘must take account of the right to respect for private and family 
life, as laid down in Article 7 of the Charter, an article which…must be read in conjunction with the 
obligation to take into consideration the child’s best interests, recognised in Article 24(2) of the 
Charter’.109 Additionally, ‘as a justification for derogating from the right of residence of Union citizens 
or members of their families, the concepts of “public policy” and “public security” must…be 
interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member States 
without being subject to control by the EU institutions’.110 Nevertheless, where the Union citizen in 
question is a minor child, as in the circumstances of CS,111 their right to stay within the territory of the 
Union can be denied because of the behaviour of others i.e. through no criminal fault of their own.  
For states, making a decision to withdraw citizenship is the only method, in extremis, through 
which they can deny a right to reside to their own citizens while still complying with the requirements 
of international law.112 But the Union cannot confer or withdraw its own citizenship, and has 
essentially accepted that ‘its’ citizens may be forced to leave ‘its’ territory in certain circumstances. 
Even though the parameters of such decisions are framed by EU law, they lie ultimately in the hands 
of the Member States. In this sense, unlimited or absolute rights under Article 20 TFEU would have 
 
108 Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:575, para. 81.  
109 Ibid; see similarly, Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:674, para. 36; Case C-82/16 KA, EU:C:2018:308, para. 90. 
110 Case C-165/14 Rendón Marín, EU:C:2016:575, para. 82; see further, paras 83-86, where the Court’s 
guidance on the concepts of public policy and public security aligns with the principles set out in Articles 27 
and 28 of Directive 2004/38 for situations of expulsion from a host Member State. 
111 Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:674. 
112 ‘[A] principle of international law, reaffirmed in Article 3 of Protocol No 4 to the [ECHR], that European 
Union law cannot be assumed to disregard in the context of relations between Member States, precludes a 
Member State from refusing its own nationals the right to enter its territory and remain there for any 
reason…; that principle also precludes that Member State from expelling its own nationals from its territory or 
refusing their right to reside in that territory or making such right conditional’ (Case C-434/09 McCarthy, 
EU:C:2011:277, para. 29). See further, S Iglesias Sanchez, ‘A Citizenship Right to Stay? The Right Not to Move in 
a Union Based on Free Movement’ in Kochenov (ed.), n21 above, 371, 374-375. These questions have been 
much discussed in the context of responses to acts of terrorism; see further, E Cloots, ‘The Legal Limits of 
Citizenship Deprivation as a Counterterror Strategy’ (2017) 23 European Public Law 5. See more generally, D 
Owen, ‘On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights’ (2018) 65 
Netherlands International Law Review 299. 
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been difficult to rationalise: the Member State is not directly expelling its own national in these cases, 
and there is no State-free place within Union territory where Union citizens can go with their 
‘unwanted’ family members. The power that Member States hold with respect to limiting a Union 
citizen’s right to stay within the territory of the Union does then reflect the persistence of territorial 
splintering. Even so, however, the broader trend in case law after Ruiz Zambrano suggests something 
more autonomously territorially-rooted at the heart of Article 20 TFEU rights; even the foundational 
narrative does not, in other words, seem as concerned with ensuring free movement between 
Member States at some indeterminate time in the future as the explanation in cases like Iida might 
suggest.113 The protection extended by the Court is undoubtedly ‘anchored to cross-border 
movement’114 but it is not necessarily constituted by it. Raucea suggests that free movement rights 
function as indicators of the genuine enjoyment rule’s applicability’.115 Going further, Lenaerts and 
Gutiérrez-Fons even argue that Ruiz Zambrano ‘served to emancipate EU citizenship from the 
constraints inherent in its free movement origins’.116  
Articulation of a right to stay within the territory of the Union provides a first important clue 
in the search for more nuanced explanation. Second, we can point to the deeper engagement with 
Charter rights seen in recent case law. Third, the Court has rendered more realistic its expectation 
that Union citizens might always somehow manage to move to another Member State in order to stay 
in Union territory. For Azoulai, when looking more closely for what Scott describes as the ‘trigger’117 
for invoking EU law in Ruiz Zambrano, the Court’s antenna for ‘integrability’ in EU citizenship law is 
exposed: ‘[w]hat may have had an impact on the Court’s decision is the manner in which Mr Ruiz 
Zambrano was represented, namely as an individual well integrated into many aspects of local society. 
For example, Mr Ruiz Zambrano enjoyed stable family relationships, he and his wife were care-givers 
of their children and he had shown a willingness to create “real” social links by finding employment 
and paying taxes. Whilst being an illegal resident in Belgium, he and his family were registered in the 
municipality they lived in. More important perhaps, he manifested a desire for legality and social 
integration as evidenced by his application to have his situation regularised and his “efforts to 
integrate into Belgian society, his learning of French and his child’s attendance at pre-school”’.118  
 
113 See further, Davies, n75 above, 471-473. 
114 Reynolds, n78 above, 384 (emphasis added). 
115 Raucea, n64 above, 487 (emphasis added). 
116 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, n78 above, 761 (emphasis added). 
117 Scott, n20 above, 1344; similarly, for Raucea, ‘free movement rights function as indicators of the genuine 
enjoyment rule’s applicability’ (n64 above, 487 (emphasis added). 
118 Azoulai, n20 above, 193 and 195; referring to Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 16.  
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Extrapolating from his previous work on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Union citizens,119 Azoulai suggests 
that ‘the Court was concerned with the family’s situation, some of whose members were Union 
citizens who had made a place within Union territory the centre of their personal and social life’.120 
Crucially, he argues that ‘this construction implies that the Court is taking legal possession of the 
territories of the Member States’ and thereby creating ‘a special legal habitat for “European 
individuals” deserving of protection. It refers to it as the “territory of the Union”, a proxy for the idea 
of a far-reaching European society’.121 In fact, according a relatively generous expanse of discretion to 
the Member States regarding the expulsion of ‘bad’ family members – and with them, where 
necessary, dependent Union citizens – fits beautifully with this explanation of things too: it is the very 
‘resilience of deportability’ that ‘disaggregate[s] the common space as a geographical and legal area 
with respect to which citizens can rely on it as their territory of reference, within which they can feel 
secure through an unconditional right to remain’.122 
Retuning the Ruiz Zambrano case law in this way both entrenches and re-forms the purpose 
of free movement in the foundational narrative of territory in EU citizenship law. At one level, freedom 
of movement is itself placeable in the sphere of Union values. Iglesias Sánchez makes this point both 
from the perspective of Union citizens – observing that ‘in conditions of free movement individuals 
have the choice to relocate and enjoy a greater level of individual freedom which translates into real 
and effective possibilities to pursue their happiness and economic progress in a wider geographical 
space’123 – and through the more systemic fact that ‘in the structure of the European Union, mobility 
is a means to an end, namely, greater equality and social cohesion’.124 In the latter sense, protecting 
freedom of movement is also a surrogate for protecting other values. As indicated in Section I above, 
the Court moved towards precisely this richer understanding of Union territory in Tjebbes.125 For 
Raucea, it is about the Union citizen’s ‘right to have a place where she is entitled to take part, to some 
extent, in the schema of distribution of rights which characterises the European polity’.126 Importantly, 
 
119 L Azoulai, ‘The (Mis)construction of the European Individual – Two essays on Union Citizenship Law”, EUI 
working papers, LAW 2014/14, at https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/33293; L Azoulai and S Coutts, 
‘Restricting Union Citizen’s Residence Rights on Grounds of Public Security – Where Union Citizenship and the 
AFSJ Meet: P.I.’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 553. 
120 Azoulai, n21 above, 196.  
121 Ibid 197-198 (emphasis added). 
122 Iglesias Sanchez, n112 above, 384 (emphasis added).  
123 Ibid 380. 
124 Ibid 392 (emphasis added). 
125 See again, Case C-221/17 Tjebbes, EU:C:2019:189, para. 46. I am grateful to Stephen Coutts for highlighting 
this point. 
126 Raucea, n64 above, 485; see similarly, her idea of ‘the European community Union’ (486). 
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though, this ‘does not mean that the free movement rules have lost their constitutional relevance; 
rather, it implies that the time has come to construct European citizenship on firmer ground’.127 
Retuning the Ruiz Zambrano case law also constructs a bridge from the foundational narrative 
to the protective and systemic narratives outlined in Section IV below by elucidating the critical 
importance of common values that are underpinned by (the system of) EU law. In the protective and 
systemic narratives, we see the status of Union citizenship intersecting with the framework and 
objectives of the AFSJ. Lindahl’s conception of territory as a common place involves ‘two correlative 
dimensions’: ‘[t]he first is normative, and, in the case of the [AFSJ], concerns a claim about the 
common interest of the EU. To be common, an interest must be bounded, and this means that a legal 
order necessarily selects certain values to grant them legal protection and discards other values as 
legally irrelevant. This is tantamount to identifying the values on which the EU confers legal protection 
as its own values. The second dimension is physical, in so far as the legal order’s claim to common 
values is determined by means of boundaries that establish where individuals ought or ought not to 
be’.128 In that understanding, ‘values are a constitutive feature of territoriality as such; indeed, space 
becomes the area – the EU’s own place – when normatively mediated in terms of values deemed to 
be legally relevant’.129 In the narratives that have developed alongside the foundational narrative, this 
interplay between the normative and physical dimensions of Union territory becomes acutely salient. 
 
IV. Parallel narratives of territory in EU citizenship law 
 
The discussion in Section III disclosed that an ‘intrinsic connection’ to freedom of movement is a valid 
but also incomplete explanation of the foundational narrative of territory in EU citizenship law. In 
Section IV.A below, we see that a ‘protective’ narrative running in parallel in a different line of case 
law solidifies Azoulai’s idea of Union territory as a ‘special legal habitat for “European individuals” 
deserving of protection’ in many respects. The protective narrative advances how the character and 
values of the Union are used to ensure that Union citizenship is ‘emplaced citizenship’.130 
Fundamentally, the Court progresses its understanding of Union territory as the place where Union 
citizens ought to be and exploits the distinctive mechanisms of the EU legal order to achieve it. In 
distinction from the foundational case law, the Court invokes Article 21 rather than Article 20 TFEU as 
the relevant source of citizenship rights. That should root the protective narrative even more firmly in 
 
127 D Sarmiento and E Sharpston, ‘European Citizenship and Its New Union: Time to Move On?’ in Kochenov 
(ed.), n21 above, 226, 241. 
128 Lindahl, n2 above, 468 (emphasis in original). 
129 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
130 Ibid 473 (emphasis in original). 
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free movement than Ruiz Zambrano case law yet there is, at the same time, ambiguity around how 
the situations in the relevant judgments connect to the fundamentals of the legal framework and, 
more particularly, to the limits and conditions normally attached to free movement rights based on 
Article 21 TFEU.  
If the foundational narrative is about securing a home within the territory of the Union, the 
protective narrative rouses the defensive qualities of home against the ‘outside’. However, the 
essentials of the protective narrative are profoundly challenged by the parallel ‘systemic’ narrative 
unspooled in Section IV.B. In the cases considered there, concern for Union citizens(hip) subsides. 
Sustaining the system of the Union appears to be privileged over Union citizenship in situations both 
confined internally within and extending outwards beyond the external edges of Union territory. The 
Court navigates political ground more graphically in its decision-making. As a result, the relationship 
between territory and legal place must be interrogated more deeply. In Section IV.C, the judgment in 
Wightman is used to show how parallel narratives can be integrated; better reflecting the 
interdependency of the interests at stake and better contributing to a Union system that confronts 
rather than suppresses its complexity.  
 
A. The protective narrative: animating Union citizenship in the AFSJ 
 
The protective narrative of the territory of the Union is drawn from the intersection of EU citizenship 
law and the AFSJ, more specifically in the context of requests by third States for the extradition of 
Union citizens beyond the borders of the Union. As indicated in Section II above, these interests 
formally intersect through Article 3(2) TEU, which states that ‘[t]he Union shall offer its citizens an 
area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons 
is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’. The fundamental differences attributed to 
surrender based on extradition and surrender based on a European Arrest Warrant reflect the 
differences between systems that are external and internal to the Union. In LM, the Court confirmed 
that ‘[t]he purpose of Framework Decision 2002/584…is to replace the multilateral system of 
extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 with a system of 
surrender between judicial authorities of convicted or suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing 
judgments or of conducting prosecutions, the system of surrender being based on the principle of 
mutual recognition’.131 That system ‘has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between 
 
131 Case C-216/18 PPU (Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (LM), 
EU:C:2018:586, para. 39 (emphasis added); Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 2002 OJ L190/1. 
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the Member States’.132 The existence of mutual trust is both implied and justified by the foundations 
of EU law itself, which is ‘based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all 
the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the 
European Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU’.133 Crucially for present purposes, ‘the very 
possibility and concrete realisation of these values, whether separately or jointly, depends on 
boundaries that determine the territorial unity of a legal community’.134 
In the case law considered here, Union citizenship is engaged by the Court to explain a novel 
override of expectations set by extradition requests issued by third States, in order to contain the 
situations of Union citizens within the territory of the Union where possible. Such an outcome does 
ensure that the Union citizens in question can exercise free movement and residence rights should 
they choose to do so, and, in that respect, the protective narrative aligns with the ‘intrinsic connection’ 
logic of the foundational narrative. However, the alignment is superficial at most for, in the case law 
considered here, the Court overlooks the basic regulatory framework of free movement law. Freedom 
of movement is therefore even more obviously about the means than the end.135 It provides Scott’s 
‘trigger’ for invoking EU law; but awkwardly. Petruhhin institutes the protective narrative in the way 
that Ruiz Zambrano institutes the foundational narrative. The case concerned an extradition request 
from Russia received by Latvian authorities shortly after Mr Petruhhin – an Estonian national – was 
arrested in Latvia. The request indicated that Mr Petruhhin was accused of attempted large-scale 
organised drug-trafficking. His extradition to Russia was authorised by the Latvian Public Prosecutor’s 
Office but he appealed, arguing that he should be entitled to the same protection against extradition 
to Russia that Latvian nationals enjoy under national law as well as under a bilateral agreement with 
the Russian Federation. However, on the basis that, under national law, only Latvian nationals who 
committed a criminal offence in a third country could be prosecuted for that offence in Latvia, 
 
132 Case C-216/18 PPU (Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (LM), 
EU:C:2018:586, para. 40. In a different context, AG Kokott outlines similarly the mutual recognition of Member 
State integration requirements for third country nationals who had already resided in another Member State 
under Directive 2003/109 for third-country nationals who are long-term residents (n80 above) compared to the 
‘different quality’ of ‘[t]he first entry of family members into the European Union’ under Directive 2003/86/EC 
on the right to family reunification, 2003 OJ L251/12; AG Kokott in Case C-153/14 K and A, EU:C:2015:186, paras 
29-30 of the Opinion.  
133 Case C-216/18 PPU (Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (LM), 
EU:C:2018:586, para. 35 (emphasis added); referring to Case C-284/16 Achmea, EU:C:2018:158, para. 34. On 
the meaning and requirements of mutual trust, as determined by the Court, see e.g. M Schwarz, ‘Let’s Talk 
About Trust, Baby! Theorising Trust and Mutual Recognition in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
(2018) 24 ELJ 124; L Mancano, ‘Judicial Harmonisation through Autonomous Concepts of European Union Law: 
The Example of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision’ (2018) 43 EL Rev 69; K Lenaerts, ‘La Vie 
apres l'Avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 805. 
134 Lindahl, n2 above, 474.  
135 Iglesias Sanchez, n112 above, 392. 
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Advocate General Bot did not consider that the applicant was in a comparable situation with Latvian 
nationals for the purposes of EU equal treatment requirements under Article 18 TFEU.136  
In its judgment, the Court took a radically different approach. It first acknowledged that ‘in 
the absence of an international agreement between the European Union and the third country 
concerned, the rules on extradition fall within the competence of the Member States’.137 But it then 
invoked the established requirement that ‘in situations covered by EU law, the national rules 
concerned must have due regard to the latter’.138 Next, the Court recalled that ‘Mr Petruhhin, an 
Estonian national, made use, in his capacity as a Union citizen, of his right to move freely within the 
European Union by moving to Latvia, so that the situation at issue in the main proceedings falls within 
the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU, which sets out the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality’.139 However, instead of then engaging in the 
comparability analysis required by the substantive application of equal treatment law, the Court 
observed that ‘the unequal treatment which allows the extradition of a Union citizen who is a national 
of another Member State, such as Mr Petruhhin, gives rise to a restriction of freedom of movement, 
within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU’.140 A restriction of freedom of movement may be justified only 
where it is justifiable on public interest grounds and also proportionate. In that light, the Court 
accepted that ‘[t]he objective of preventing the risk of impunity for persons who have committed an 
offence…must be considered a legitimate objective in EU law’.141  
The Court did not invoke Union citizenship as the ‘fundamental status of Member State 
nationals’ but it did deftly slide the whole basis of its analysis from equal treatment under Article 18 
TFEU to restrictions on freedom of movement under Article 21 TFEU. In other words, the Court used 
the lighter-touch free movement method to realise an equal treatment outcome.142 It is interesting 
that the Court has never expressed the ‘intrinsic connection’ to movement in Ruiz Zambrano case law 
 
136 AG Bot in Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:330, esp. paras 64-69. Nevertheless, he did consider that 
‘[s]ince the situation of a national of a Member State who, like Mr Petruhhin, has exercised his freedom to 
move and reside in the territory of another Member State, falls…within the scope of EU law…Article 19(2) of 
the Charter may apply in such a situation’ (para. 75 of the Opinion). In that light, he suggested that the 
‘methodology’ developed by the Court in Aranyosi and Căldăraru in the context of the EAW ‘can be transposed 
to a situation in which, following a request for the extradition of a citizen of the Union issued by a third 
country, the judicial authority of the requested Member State ascertains whether the guarantees laid down in 
Article 19(2) of the Charter are respected’ (para. 83 of the Opinion; referring to Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-
659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198, para. 94). 
137 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 26.  
138 Ibid para. 27. 
139 Ibid para. 31 (emphasis added). 
140 Ibid para. 33.  
141 Ibid paras 34 and 37. 
142 As Costa stresses, ‘neither the AG nor the ECJ at any moment implied that Member States should apply a 
nationality exception in their extradition traffic with third States; merely that, if they do, they shall dispense 
comparable treatment to other EU citizens’ (MJ Costa, ‘The Emerging EU Extradition Law: Petruhhin and 
Beyond’ (2017) 8 New Journal of European Criminal Law 192, 196). 
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with reference to potential interferences with freedom of movement under Article 21 TFEU; and that, 
conversely, it did not engage Article 20 TFEU as a basis for rights in Petruhhin. After all, the non-
extradition of Mr Petruhhin would coincide with protecting his prospective free movement rights in 
line with the explained objective of Ruiz Zambrano case law while his extradition to Russia would 
clearly bring about forced departure from the territory of the Union.143 This point about legal basis 
separates the foundational and protective narratives in a formal sense. But it is important to 
remember that a decision taken by a third State – and one that is perfectly valid within the framework 
of international law – does not have to be taken with ‘due regard’ or indeed any regard to EU law, 
therefore limiting the prospects of what the Court can actually do about it. In essence, the 
proportionality framework that Member State national authorities must abide by under the Ruiz 
Zambrano case law is of no consequence for decisions taken by national authorities in Russia.  
Turning from form to substance, Mr Petruhhin had moved to another Member State and the 
Court used that actual fact in the moulding of its novel intra-EU solution, the detail of which is returned 
to below. Meanwhile, it is argued that, even substantively, Petruhhin does not fit properly into the 
movement-centric foundational narrative either. It should be emphasised that the Court drew from 
Article 21 TFEU in two different ways in Petruhhin – first, because Mr Petruhhin ‘made use’ of freedom 
of movement thereby triggering ‘the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 
18 TFEU’;144 and, second, because his extradition would generate ‘unequal treatment’ that ‘gives rise 
to a restriction of freedom of movement within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU’,145 on the other. In 
other words, the Court used both past/present and prospective free movement in its reasoning. 
However, it did not interrogate the legal dimensions of Mr Petruhhin’s presence in Latvia at either of 
these two stages of analysis. In particular, we do not know if his presence there was lawful with 
reference to the requirements laid down in Directive 2004/38. That Directive establishes ‘a gradual 
system as regards the right of residence in the host Member State, which reproduces, in essence, the 
stages and conditions set out in the various instruments of European Union law and case-law 
preceding that directive and culminates in the right of permanent residence’.146 A Union citizen may 
reside in another State for up to three months without any conditions (Article 6). For periods of 
 
143 For example, ‘one possible reading of Petruhhin did highlight the protective quality of the Union’s legal 
order for its citizens and their right to the territory of that Union, manifested in the rights of free movement 
and residence’ (S Coutts, ‘From Union citizens to national subjects: Pisciotti’ (2019) 56 CML Rev 521 at 537). 
See similarly, 538: ‘[t]he individual’s rights to free movement and residence are diminished less by his 
remaining in the Union, be it in the requested Member State or the Member State of nationality. It is through 
the rights of free movement and residence that a broader right to the territory of the Union as a whole is 
developed’. 
144 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 31. 
145 Ibid para. 33. 
146 Joined Cases C-316/16 and C-424/16 B and Vomero, EU:C:2018:256, para. 51.  
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residence in a host State that exceed three months, the right to reside is subject to the conditions in 
Article 7(1) and, according to Article 14(2), ‘that right is retained only if the Union citizen and his family 
members satisfy those conditions’.147 When the conditions are fulfilled, residence in the host State is 
lawful. Importantly, Article 24(1) then applies: it guarantees that ‘Union citizens residing on the basis 
of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the 
nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty’.  
In Petruhhin, the Court never confirms or even refers to the duration of the applicant’s 
presence in Latvia. It stated that he ‘made use’ of his free movement rights. On that basis alone, his 
situation fell within the scope of application of the Treaties and therefore triggered the relevance of 
Article 18 TFEU. The Court then asserted that extraditing him amounted to unequal treatment – 
without explaining why, notwithstanding the contrary analysis of Advocate General Bot. No reference 
was made to the conditions established by Directive 2004/38, which means that the legal framework 
regulating freedom of movement was basically ignored. In Dano, concerning equal treatment and 
eligibility for social assistance, the Court ruled that ‘the principle of non-discrimination, laid down 
generally in Article 18 TFEU, is given more specific expression in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 in 
relation to Union citizens who, like the applicants in the main proceedings, exercise their right to move 
and reside within the territory of the Member States’.148 Ms Dano was not found not to be residing in 
the host State ‘on the basis’ of Directive 2004/38 since it was assumed that she did not fulfil the 
conditions for lawful residence in Article 7. It is true that ‘in contrast to…exclusion from social 
assistance schemes, extradition to third States is not regulated by EU legislation expressly providing 
for a different treatment of the host Member State’s nationals and other EU citizens’.149 However, 
Directive 2004/38 does not address entitlement to social assistance in the period between three 
months and five years of residence in the host State i.e. the period at issue in Dano. Moreover, both 
Article 24(1) of the Directive and the relevant part of the judgment in Dano are expressed in very 
general language. If we apply Petruhhin analysis to Dano, she also ‘made use’ of her right to move and 
reside and the unequal treatment of her exclusion from social assistance in the host State may well 
restrict her capacity to (continue to) exercise that right. If, conversely, we apply Dano to Petruhhin, 
the basis and especially the duration of his presence in Latvia have to become significant.  
 
147 Ibid para. 53. These conditions involve working or being self-employed in the host State under Article 
7(1)(a); possessing sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during the period of residence as well as comprehensive sickness insurance under Article 
7(1)(b); studying at an accredited host State institution under similar financial conditions under Article 7(1)(c); 
or being a family member accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies one of the preceding sets of 
conditions under Article 7(1)(d). 
148 Case C-333/13 Dano, EU:C:2014:2358, para. 61 (emphasis added).  
149 M Böse, ‘Mutual Recognition, Extradition to Third Countries and Union Citizenship: Petruhhin’ (2017) 54 
CML Rev 1781, 1794.  
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In Petruhhin, the Court avoids the problem because ‘a non-discrimination analysis is ultimately 
displaced by a free movement analysis… [I]mportantly for the solution ultimately adopted by the 
Court, it is not Article 18 TFEU that is violated by this difference in treatment. Instead, the difference 
in treatment is characterized as a restriction on movement within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU’.150 
Avoiding a problem does not make it go away. However, if we shift the premise of the analysis yet 
again, from free movement to the territory of the Union, a more compelling explanation of the Court’s 
very different approaches comes into focus. In Dano, the rootedness of the applicant’s home in the 
host State is never deeply probed. She is denied social assistance, but the host State is not forced to 
expel her. Should it decide to do so, she can still find a home in the territory of the Union, either in 
her own State or in any other Member State. In Petruhhin, the host State will not remain burdened by 
the applicant’s presence: he must either be extradited outside the territory of the Union or, as 
returned to below, removed instead to his home State. On that analysis, it is not that he is more 
‘deserving’ of the protection of EU law than Ms Dano but actually that, from the perspective of keeping 
Union citizens within Union territory, both applicants ‘win’. 
In Petruhhin, the Court did not refer expressly to the ‘territory of the Union’ but to the AFSJ 
as conceived in Article 3(2) TEU.151 Nevertheless, in assessing the proportionality of the restriction 
relative to the legitimate objective of preventing the risk of impunity, the Court truly animated the 
AFSJ as the ‘special legal habitat for “European individuals”’ envisioned by Azoulai – not even 
concerning itself with whether Mr Petruhhin was particularly ‘deserving of protection’ in light of his 
particular circumstances or not. Interestingly, the Court refers explicitly to ‘territory’ in Petruhhin in 
connection with the territory of a Member State, observing that while ‘the non-extradition of its own 
nationals is generally counterbalanced by the possibility for the requested Member State to prosecute 
such nationals for serious offences committed outside its territory, that Member State as a general 
rule has no jurisdiction to try cases concerning such acts when neither the perpetrator nor the victim 
of the alleged offence is a national of that Member State’; in that light, ‘[e]xtradition thus allows 
offences committed in the territory of a State by persons who have fled that territory not to remain 
unpunished’.152 National rules allowing extradition to a third State are therefore appropriate, in 
principle, relative to the public interest of preventing impunity. But in its analysis of ‘whether there is 
an alternative measure less prejudicial to the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 21 TFEU which 
would be equally effective in achieving the objective of preventing [that risk]’,153 the Court reasoned 
 
150 Coutts n143 above, 528-529. See similarly, Böse, n149 above, 1785.  
151 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 36. 
152 Ibid para. 39. 
153 Ibid para. 41; analysis called into question by Böse on the basis that ‘priority of a less restrictive measure is 
subject to the condition that it is equally effective to attain the objective pursued. In this regard, the obligation 
to inform the other Member State in order to trigger the requested person’s surrender to that State might give 
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on the basis of Union territory as the relevant territorial unit. This legal place is underpinned by the 
requirement of sincere cooperation outlined in Article 4(3) TEU; by the EAW (‘which the European 
Council has referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation’154) and other ‘numerous 
instruments of mutual assistance intended to facilitate such cooperation’;155 and by the responsibility 
of the Union ‘in its relations with the wider world, …to uphold and promote its values and interests 
and contribute to the protection of its citizens, in accordance with Article 3(5) TEU’.156 In the 
intensified register of the AFSJ, the territory of the Union as legal place and common place is therefore 
articulated in a more complex and multidimensional way than in Ruiz Zambrano case law, providing 
the platform from which the real novelty of the Petruhhin case then unfolded: the Court ruled that ‘it 
is necessary, in order to safeguard EU nationals from measures liable to deprive them of the rights of 
free movement and residence provided for in Article 21 TFEU, while combatting impunity in respect 
of criminal offences, to apply all the cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms provided for in 
the criminal field under EU law’.157  
In practical terms, this requires that ‘the exchange of information with the Member State of 
which the person concerned is a national must be given priority in order to afford the authorities of 
that Member State, in so far as they have jurisdiction, pursuant to their national law, to prosecute 
that person for offences committed outside national territory, the opportunity to issue a European 
arrest warrant for the purposes of prosecution’.158 By ‘cooperating accordingly with the Member State 
of which the person concerned is a national and giving priority to that potential arrest warrant over 
the extradition request, the host Member State acts in a manner which is less prejudicial to the 
exercise of the right to freedom of movement while avoiding, as far as possible, the risk that the 
offence prosecuted will remain unpunished’.159 For Coutts, this ‘neat solution…ensured insofar as 
possible that the individual remained on the territory of the Union, thereby protecting his or her rights 
to free movement and residence, whilst at the same time ensuring that he or she faced justice. 
 
rise to time-consuming procedures and result in impunity if the requested person must be released when the 
maximum period for detention has expired … Furthermore, there is no established mechanism for the new 
procedure and its implementation in court practice. What is the time-limit to issue a European arrest warrant? 
Which Member State shall be informed if the country of origin and the country of permanent residence differ? 
Thus, extradition to the third State may prove a more effective means to avoid impunity than the mechanism 
proposed by the Court and, thus, necessary as required by the proportionality test’ (Böse, n149 above, 1791). 
154 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 43; referring to Case C-388/08 PPU Leymann and 
Pustovarov, EU:C:2008:669, para. 49. 
155 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 43; referring to Case C-129/14 Spasic, EU:C:2014:586. 
156 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 44. 
157 Ibid para. 47.  
158 Ibid para. 48.  
159 Ibid para. 49 (emphasis added).  
 32 
Conceptually, the judgment was rooted in a regard for the rights of the individual that was linked to 
the status of Union citizen and a certain protective role of the Union legal order over “its citizens”’.160  
The Court does not formally undermine the extradition framework governed by international 
law, but it does invent a Union-specific ‘workaround’ to sidestep the implications of it. As in Ruiz 
Zambrano case law, the objective of not depriving a Union citizen of free movement and residence 
rights is the overt explanation provided (though here using Article 21 and not 20 TFEU). But the 
creative lengths to which the Court was prepared to go confirm that the AFSJ is a particular kind of 
legal place. In dealing with the criminal behaviour of its citizens, the Court makes ‘a statement 
concerning the “right place” for such individuals. Citizenship can be viewed as an institution that 
emplaces individuals within particular territories and legal orders, which designates the right place for 
an individual in a normative and geographic sense’.161 Costa speaks of the ‘meaningful…line that has 
been drawn between the EU as a criminal justice area (formed primordially by the jurisdictions of the 
Member States, but now amounting to clearly more than the mere sum of those parts) and all other 
jurisdictions, whereby the first seizes primacy in the prosecution of crimes committed in the territory 
of the latter, often against local victims’.162  
There is the irony that ‘the internal extradition system of the EU (the EAW) is far less 
protective than classic extradition, including in respect of the nationality of the offender’.163 
Nevertheless, Costa highlights the fact that ‘EU citizens are finally drawing advantages from a criminal 
justice area that, internally, has had them exposed to such onerous and swift mechanisms as the EAW’, 
attributing to Petruhhin a shift from repressive to protective function for the EAW.164 In that sense, 
Iglesias Sánchez’s description of the EAW as ‘as a compensatory measure that somehow outweighs 
the possibilities offered by free movement’ is almost reversed: the EAW itself provides the possibilities 
in the protective case law narrative.165 Costa does identify a testing point for the territorial argument 
in observing that ‘the Petruhhin principle does not seem to apply if the Member State of which the 
person is a national would itself extradite him/her, since in that event one element is missing which is 
indispensable to elicit the EU citizenship exception: an impairment of free movement’.166 If a Union 
citizen has already ‘made use’ of free movement rights, then Petruhhin analysis applies. However, if 
the situation that Costa alludes to concerns what happens after the home State issues an EAW, an 
analogy could be drawn to the discretion retained by Member States with respect to public policy or 
 
160 Coutts, n143 above, 522-523 (emphasis added). 
161 Ibid 539 (emphasis added). 
162 Costa, n142 above, 211 (emphasis added). 
163 Ibid 211. 
164 Ibid 214. 
165 Iglesias Sancheez, n112 above, 383. 
166 Costa, n142 above, 211.  
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public security limits on Article 20 TFEU residence rights:  at a certain point, the Court has done what 
it can within the framework of EU law; and only the Member States can take the final decision. 
Crucially, then, the Court cannot guarantee that the citizen’s business can be contained within 
the territory of the Union. In galvanising the Member States as enforcers of EU law, what it imposes 
amounts to an obligation to aim for that outcome: translating hope into legal responsibility in as much 
as that is possible. The territory of the Union is thus safeguarded by legally induced cooperative 
mechanisms, demonstrating precisely what sincere cooperation is all about; that ‘the European Union 
and the Member States are, in full mutual respect, to assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties’.167 The resulting interplay does of course, at one level, concern the inside and the 
outside. Recalling Scott’s ‘contested transition zone between the territorial and the extraterritorial’,168 
EU law cannot reach directly into the decision-making processes of third States, but its effects of may 
still end up being profoundly felt there. But there is also the interplay between the inside and the 
other inside i.e. between the Union and its Member States. In Petruhhin, the Court ‘in no way implies 
that EU citizens should not as a matter of principle be extradited to third States; merely that 
sometimes that is necessary to avoid discrimination and impairment of free movement. Therefore, 
Member States are not required to adopt this, or any other measure aimed at optimising the 
applicability of the EU citizenship exception’.169 However, ‘Petruhhin seems destined to trigger 
reactions from Member States in that respect’.170 In particular, Court is ‘mandating legal authorities 
to posit and enforce the distinction between inside and outside as the distinction between an own 
territory and foreign territories’.171 The other evolution from Ruiz Zambrano seen in this respect is 
that the obligation created by EU law entails not just a responsibility for one Member State – the 
Union citizen’s home State in that line of case law – but for both home and host States through the 
cooperative processes of the AFSJ.  
What results exemplifies the additional character of Union citizenship prescribed by Article 20 
TFEU and the additional protection offered by the territory of the Union over and above the territories 
of the Member States per se. In the territory of the Union, ‘law can modulate and counterbalance the 
power that Member States have to shape and to affect, through their nationality and migration laws, 
the enjoyment of rights by European citizens’.172 The borders of the Union then become more 
entrenched through the ambition of protecting its territory and thereby protecting its citizens. 
However, it should be recalled that the legal place and common place reasoning in Petruhhin 
 
167 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 42 (emphasis added). 
168 Scott, n20 above, 1379. 
169 Costa, n142 above, 208. 
170 Ibid (emphasis added).  
171 Lindahl, n2 above, 480. 
172 Raucea, n64 above, 489. 
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generates borders that are normative as well as geographical.173 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons explain 
this point through the observation that ‘EU citizenship is intended to promote the feeling of belonging 
to a community of values that stands up for all its citizens when they cross the external borders of the 
EU’.174 The argument is further supported by the fact that the ‘decision of a Member State to extradite 
a Union citizen, in a situation such as that of the main proceedings, comes within the scope of Article 
18 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU and, therefore, of EU law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter’.175 Article 19(2) of the Charter provides that ‘[n]o one may be removed, expelled or extradited 
to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture 
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. In Petruhhin, the referring court had asked 
whether it was sufficient that the requesting State is a party to the ECHR. The Court first used the 
ECtHR’s own finding that ‘[t]he existence of declarations and accession to international treaties 
guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure 
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where reliable sources have reported practices 
resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the 
[ECHR]’.176 Second, following Advocate General Bot, the Court transposed its reasoning from Aranyosi 
and Căldăraru to rule that where ‘the competent authority of the requested Member State is in 
possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals in the 
requesting third State, it is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide 
on the extradition of a person to that State’.177  
The relationship between the Charter and the ECHR is returned to in Section IV.B below. It will 
also be seen there that the main findings in Petruhhin were confirmed in Pisciotti even for situations 
where the EU does have an extradition agreement with the relevant third State.178 In Raugevicius, 
Petruhhin was also applied to requests for surrender to a third State for the purpose not of prosecuting 
the individual concerned but enforcing a custodial sentence already imposed. Mr Raugevicius, a 
Lithuanian national, resided in Finland. He was convicted of a drugs offence in Russia in 2011 and given 
a suspended prison sentence. Later in 2011, a Russian court revoked that suspension because of a 
 
173 Lindahl, n2 above, 469. 
174 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, n78 above, 763 (emphasis added).  
175 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 52; see similarly, Case C-473/15 Schotthöfer and Steiner, 
EU:C:2017:633. 
176 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 57; referring to ECtHR judgment of 28 February 2008 
in Saadi v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2008:0228JUD003720106, § 147. 
177 Case C-182/15 Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, para. 58; the Court addressed evidentiary requirements in para. 
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objective, reliable, specific and properly updated. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, 
judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the requesting third 
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178 Case C-191/16 Pisciotti, EU:C:2018:222. 
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breach of supervision obligations. In December 2016, Russia sent a request to the Finnish authorities 
seeking the arrest and extradition to Russia of Mr Raugevicius for the purpose of enforcing his 
custodial sentence. In challenging his extradition, Mr Raugevicius stressed ‘that he had lived in Finland 
for a considerable length of time and that he was the father of two children residing in that Member 
State who are of Finnish nationality’.179  
The referring court observed that the European Convention on Extradition, which makes it 
possible for the requested State to prosecute its own citizens when it does not extradite them, does 
not require that State to enforce a sentence pronounced by a court of another State party. However, 
sustaining the theme of cooperation that was central in Petruhhin, the Court indicated that ‘there are 
mechanisms under national law and/or international law which make it possible for those persons to 
serve their sentences, in particular, in the State of which they are nationals and, in doing so, increase 
their chances of social reintegration after they have completed their sentences’.180 The Court pointed 
in particular to the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, to which all EU Member 
States and Russia are parties and Article 2 of which allows a person to be transferred to their country 
of origin to serve a custodial sentence with the objective of furthering their social rehabilitation.181 
The Court also observed that Finnish law makes it possible for its own nationals and foreign nationals 
permanently residing there to serve a sentence pronounced elsewhere in Finland.182 
Extrapolating a framework designed for State territories to the composite territory of the 
Union, the Court concluded that ‘it cannot be ruled out that Mr Raugevicius may be regarded as a 
foreign national permanently residing in Finland’ for the purposes of relevant Finnish law.183 On that 
basis, he could serve his sentence in Finland ‘provided that both Russia and Mr Raugevicius consent 
to this’.184 The Court expressly referred to the ‘fundamental’ nature of Union citizenship,185 and 
reaffirms that the situation of a Union citizen who has already exercised the right to move and reside 
falls within the scope of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU. In the context of preventing the risk of impunity, it 
equated the situation of Finnish nationals and ‘nationals of other Member States who reside 
permanently in Finland and demonstrate a certain degree of integration into that State’s society’.186 
However, if the national court were to find that Mr Raugevicius is not ‘residing permanently’ in Finland 
on that basis, his extradition should be resolved on the basis of national or international law, subject 
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182 Ibid para. 38. 
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to the proviso that ‘the extradition will not infringe the rights guaranteed by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Article 19’.187  
In his Opinion, Advocate General Bot had directly linked the underlying aim of social 
rehabilitation and the concept of human dignity in Article 1 of the Charter.188 He further emphasised 
that ‘the social rehabilitation of the Union citizen in the Member State in which he has become 
genuinely integrated is not only in his interest, but also in that of the European Union in general’,189 
reflecting the element of commonality. Similarly, for Coutts, in the line of case law instituted by 
Petruhhin, ‘we are not dealing with an offence within the Union or one that has affected either the 
interests of the Union or of its Member States. Rather, we are concerned with a more abstract 
principle that justice be done more generally’ – in that light, he draws attention to how the Court uses 
the AFSJ as ‘a broader normative source to ground its decisions’.190 In an interesting way, Mr 
Raugevicius’ integration into the society of the host State – into a particular territorial unit – is what 
triggered an intention to protect him in the composite territory of the Union i.e. ‘against’ the 
extradition request from outside. Just as in Petruhhin, that does not mean that the Union eschews 
international mechanisms: on the contrary, in Raugevicius, it proactively engages them to protect 
both its citizens and its territorial values. Scott observed the same dynamic in a different context, 
noting that ‘EU [legislative] measures that incorporate “extraterritorial” triggers also frequently 
incorporate jurisdictional “safety valves” that are intended to prevent jurisdictional over-reach and to 
facilitate cooperation and to reduce conflict between States’.191 Two further findings from her work 
on the global reach of EU legislation have strong resonance for the judicial methods developed in 
Petruhhin and Raugevicius. First, ‘[t]hese mechanisms…create opportunities for continuing dialogue 
between the EU and third country regulators and entities, setting in train a discursive process rather 
than an emphatic, one-sided and uncompromising “extraterritorial” application of EU rules’.192 
Second, ‘[i]t is often the case that when the EU relies on novel “extraterritorial” triggers, these triggers 
take the form of contextual standards rather than rules. Contextual standards render the application 
of EU law conditional on a case-by-case, contextual, assessment of whether the criteria established 
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by an open-ended standard have been met in a specific set of circumstances, rather than on the 
application of a more clearly delimited but more rigid rule’.193 
Just as in Petruhhin, however, there are notable questions around the Court’s foregrounding 
of freedom of movement while simultaneously bypassing the details of its regulatory framework in 
Raugevicius. In particular, the Court enabled the national authorities to consider a looser conception 
of ‘permanent resident’ than the more demanding Union concept created by Article 16 of Directive 
2004/38 – which may be less about due recognition of national authority and more because the 
applicant may not have fulfilled the conditions for permanent residence under EU law. Article 16 
provides that ‘Union citizens who have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host 
Member State shall have the right of permanent residence there’. The requirement to reside ‘legally’ 
connects to the conditions for lawful residence in Article 7.194 However, residing legally depends ‘not 
only on territorial and time factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the level of integration 
in the host Member State’.195 Bringing analogous complications for Mr Raugevicius, the Court has 
ruled in that respect that ‘that ‘the imposition of a prison sentence by a national court is such as to 
show the non-compliance by the person concerned with the values expressed by the society of the 
host Member State in its criminal law, with the result that the taking into consideration of periods of 
imprisonment for the purposes of the acquisition…of the right of permanent residence for the 
purposes of Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 would clearly be contrary to the aim pursued by that 
directive in establishing that right of residence’.196 Assessing permanent residence as a concept of 
Finnish law only avoids the problem; delivering protection for the Union citizen. Similarly, the Court 
rather brazenly cited Dano for the proposition that ‘[e]very Union citizen may…rely on the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 18 TFEU in all situations falling within 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law, and those situations include, as in the dispute in the main 
proceedings, the exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 21 TFEU’.197 Yet, as explained in Section 
IV.A above, the Court in fact significantly reduced the scope of EU equal treatment law in that case.  
Other loose ends include the fact that a successful outcome in Raugevicius, from the 
perspective of the Union citizen, depended ultimately on the consent of Russia: this was conceded in 
one paragraph, as seen above, but the Court then moved directly to its restatement of the 
fundamental nature of Union citizenship. The judgment was also somewhat coy about the applicant’s 
dual nationality in this case. Legally, it is absolutely right that ‘[t]he fact that a national of a Member 
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State other than the Member State to which the extradition request was made, such as Mr 
Raugevicius, also holds the nationality of the third country…cannot deprive the person concerned of 
the freedoms he derives from EU law as a national of a Member State’.198 But his ‘third State’ 
nationality is Russian i.e. he also holds the nationality of the requesting State.199 Symbolically, then, 
by using more neutral ‘third State’ language, the Court amplifies the inside/outside significance of 
being a Union citizen. Under the protective narrative, the territory of the Union is the ‘right place’ for 
Mr Raugevicius; it is where he ‘ought to be’ – his true home, requesting State nationality aside. The 
host State may not be able to keep him there; but it is, once again, under a legal responsibility to try. 
A final point to emphasise: by understanding the territory of the Union as a special legal place 
and a special common place, there are necessarily and inherently systemic elements running through 
the protective narrative – in particular, with respect to the AFSJ, the idea that ‘as an EU citizen, the 
alleged offender has a legitimate interest in being tried in a criminal justice system committed to a 
common standard of fundamental rights and procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings’.200 But 
the systemic elements do not dominate; crucially, they facilitate rather than work against the 
protection of the citizen. When that balance is upset, we move to a different narrative. 
 
B. The systemic narrative: subduing EU citizenship in the service of the AFSJ 
 
More persuasively than the veneration of free movement rights per se, the foundational and 
protective narratives of the territory of the Union in EU citizenship law share a deeper perspective: 
that ‘leaving European territory means not only leaving Europe in the geographical sense, it also 
means leaving a community of ideals and values, it means being deprived of a certain mode of 
existence corresponding to the standards of European society’.201 It means, in other words, leaving a 
special legal place and special common place. But does it always mean this? In certain judgments 
concerning the intersection of Union citizenship and the AFSJ, a different narrative prevails. Here, the 
citizen is either mentioned but not ultimately protected; or not even mentioned at all. Instead, in 
response to particular instances of confrontation, the primary concern is systemic i.e. for the 
functioning and continued health of the EU legal order more abstractly. In the systemic narrative, 
priorities internal to the territory of the Union take precedence over the protection of the citizen. 
Additionally, movement outside the territory of the Union – even more specifically, the mandated 
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transfer of Union citizens to criminal justice regimes in third States – is countenanced in the interests 
of preserving a greater systemic good. The idea that the borders of the Union are normative as well 
as physical explains the latter example to some extent. However, the normative content of what is 
sustained within those borders is distorted and ultimately degraded as part of that process.   
 The judgment in Pisciotti provides the first – internal – example, bridging well from the 
protective to the systemic narrative. As noted in Section IV.A, the Court initially followed the method 
it had developed in Petruhhin and, moreover, stretched its application even to situations where the 
EU has an extradition agreement with the requesting third State – in this case, the USA. Mr Pisciotti, 
an Italian national, was arrested on a stopover at Frankfurt Airport (as he travelled to Italy from 
Nigeria) pursuant to a US extradition request in connection with anticompetitive practices. His 
extradition had already taken place, as a result of which he was convicted and served a prison 
sentence in the US. Following his release, however, he initiated legal proceedings against Germany, 
seeking to establish liability for a breach of EU law in connection with allowing his extradition in the 
first place. Further supporting the idea of freedom of movement as more the means than the end in 
AFSJ case law, the Court stated that ‘[t]he fact that, when [Mr Pisciotti] was arrested, he was only in 
transit in Germany is not capable of casting doubt’ on the fact that his situation falls within the scope 
of the Treaties.202 It then found that while, ‘[i]n principle, Article 17 of the EU-USA Agreement…allows 
a Member State, on the basis either of the provisions of a bilateral treaty or rules of its constitutional 
law, to provide for a particular outcome for its own nationals by prohibiting their extradition…that 
discretion must still be exercised in accordance with primary law and, in particular, with the rules of 
the TFEU on equal treatment and the freedom of movement of Union citizens’.203  
Again evading substantive analysis of the comparability of German nationals and other 
Member State nationals for the purposes of EU equal treatment law, the Court asserted that ‘the only 
question is whether the Federal Republic of Germany could adopt a course of action with regard to 
Mr Pisciotti which would be less prejudicial to the exercise of his right to free movement by 
considering surrendering him to the Italian Republic rather than extraditing him to the United States 
of America’.204 It then cited Petruhhin and reiterated that ‘the exchange of information with the 
Member State of which the person concerned is a national must be given priority in order, where 
relevant, to afford the authorities of that Member State the opportunity to issue a European arrest 
warrant for the purposes of prosecution’; acknowledging that while ‘that solution was adopted…in a 
context characterised by the absence of an international agreement on extradition between the 
European Union and the third State in question, it may be applied in a situation such as that at issue 
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in the main proceedings, in which the EU-USA Agreement gives the requested Member State the 
option of not extraditing its own nationals’.205 Responding to concerns from some Member States that 
prioritising a request for surrender on the basis of an EAW could undermine the effectiveness of the 
EU-USA Agreement, the Court assured that ‘a European arrest warrant issued by a Member State 
other than the requested Member State must, at least, relate to the same offences and…the issuing 
Member State must have jurisdiction, pursuant to national law, to prosecute that person for such 
offences, even if committed outside its territory’.206 
We are firmly in Petruhhin territory up to this point. However, in the very final paragraphs of 
the later judgment, the Court noted, almost in passing, that the ‘the consular authorities of the Italian 
Republic were kept informed of Mr Pisciotti’s situation before the request for extradition…was 
granted and that the Italian judicial authorities did not issue a European arrest warrant in respect of 
Mr Pisciotti’.207 It then framed its answer to the referring court around that act: ‘Articles 18 and 21 
TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding the requested Member State from drawing a distinction, 
on the basis of a rule of constitutional law, between its nationals and the nationals of other Member 
States and from granting that extradition whilst not permitting extradition of its own nationals, 
provided that the requested Member State has already put the competent authorities of the Member 
State of which the citizen is a national in a position to seek the surrender of that citizen pursuant to a 
European arrest warrant and the latter Member State has not taken any action in that regard’.208 As a 
result of that qualification, ‘the precise obligation imposed on the Member State of nationality to 
investigate the possibility of prosecution appears minimal’ and, as a result, ‘[w]e are left not so much 
with a right of the Union citizen to remain on the territory of the Union, but a right of the Member 
State of nationality to assert its jurisdiction’.209  
Coutts reinforces that impression in the suggestion that ‘the Court seems to conclude that the 
next least restrictive measure that would ensure the avoidance of impunity is extradition to the US’; 
more specifically, he argues that ‘[t]he Court skips over the possibility that Germany may be in a 
position to prosecute, simply declaring it to be irrelevant and finds with no further discussion that the 
“only question” to be answered is whether prosecution is possible by the Member State of nationality. 
However, there is clearly another possibility and hence another question to be asked. If Germany was 
in a position to prosecute Mr Pisciotti, he would remain on the territory of the Union, an outcome that 
is demonstrably less restrictive of his rights to free movement and residence in the territory of the 
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Member States of the Union’.210 Costa raises another problem: whether, especially in cases where 
issuing an EAW would be ‘the sole manner of avoiding extradition’, a Member State ‘by refraining to 
act…will be co-producing an effect (a differentiation based on nationality) that, in the light of EU law, 
is undesirable and unnecessary’.211 
Clues towards understanding what may have caused the backtracking at the end of the Court’s 
judgment in Pisciotti become more apparent in the Opinion of Advocate General Bot i.e. ‘several 
Member States which have submitted observations in these proceedings have emphasised the legal 
and practical difficulties associated with the approach adopted by the Court in [Petruhhin]’.212 
Particular concern was raised about the fact that, ‘in most cases, the Member State of which the Union 
citizen forming the subject of an extradition request is a national is unlikely to be in possession of the 
information that would enable it to issue a European arrest warrant with a view to prosecution and 
then to prosecute the person surrendered. In that event, the objective of preventing the risk of 
impunity would be jeopardised’.213 The Court ultimately preserves the Petruhhin obligation of 
cooperation on the surface of Pisciotti, but significantly dilutes its operation in practice.214 The citizen 
is significantly less protected:215 in this case, Mr Pisciotti’s removal from the territory of the Union is 
absolved in retrospect. But the concerns of certain Member States, who had highlighted the problems 
of applying Petruhhin in practice, are taken seriously.216 The citizen may lose out, but the functioning 
of the AFSJ system is protected: after all, sustaining the cooperative processes on which the AFSJ 
depends relies in turn on the trust that Member States place not only in each other but in the system 
itself. The importance of preventing impunity as a common value of that system is also respected. 
Prioritising systemic concerns is fiercely evident in the judgment in RO, in which Union 
citizenship is not mentioned at all: in fact, RO’s nationality is never mentioned either. This case – 
providing the external example for the systemic narrative – concerned a preliminary reference from 
the Irish High Court, asking whether the fact that the UK had notified its intention to withdraw from 
the Union in accordance with Article 50 TEU should affect the execution of European arrest warrants 
issued by the UK with respect to allegations of serious crimes. RO was in custody in Ireland at the 
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material time, which led to the reference being dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling 
procedure. The Court first reinforced the defining qualities of EU law in its judgment. Following the 
template articulated in Opinion 2/13 and since planted consistently across the span of EU systemic 
coverage, the Court recalled that EU law is based on ‘the fundamental premiss that each Member 
State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common 
values on which the European Union is founded’.217 The mutual trust between Member States that 
results ‘requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, 
save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU 
law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law’.218 More specifically, the ‘high 
level of trust which must exist between the Member States’ is the basis of the EAW system, meaning 
that surrender should be denied only in ‘exceptional circumstances’.219 In particular, the Framework 
Decision ‘is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Articles 2 and 6 TEU’.220 For Advocate General Szpunar, 
‘mutual recognition is probably the EU’s most distinct contribution to judicial cooperation between EU 
Member States’ authorities and…the flagship instrument in this domain is the Framework Decision’.221 
 Confronting the implications of an Article 50 TEU withdrawal notification for the system of the 
EAW, the Court ruled that ‘such a notification does not have the effect of suspending the application 
of EU law in the Member State that has given notice of its intention to withdraw from the European 
Union and, consequently, EU law, which encompasses the provisions of the Framework Decision and 
the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition inherent in that decision, continues in full force 
and effect in that State until the time of its actual withdrawal from the European Union’.222 More 
specifically, ‘mere notification’ is not an ‘exceptional circumstance…capable of justifying a refusal to 
execute a European arrest warrant issued by that Member State’.223 After all, ‘[w]ithdrawing from the 
EU, though perhaps not too palatable an option for anyone concerned, is a possibility specifically 
recognised in Article 50 TEU’.224 However, the executing judicial authority must ‘examine, after 
carrying out a specific and precise assessment of the particular case, whether there are substantial 
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grounds for believing that, after withdrawal from the European Union of the issuing Member State, 
the person who is the subject of that arrest warrant is at risk of being deprived of his fundamental 
rights and the rights derived, in essence, from Articles 26 to 28 of the Framework Decision’.225  
Up to this point in the judgment, the Court has drawn a clear line between being and not being 
an EU Member State: between being inside and being outside of that territory. But things then 
become much blurrier. The Court recalled that Article 4 of the Charter ‘correspond[s]’ to Article 3 
ECHR.226 It then stressed that ‘in this case, the issuing Member State, namely the United Kingdom, is 
party to the ECHR and…it has incorporated the provisions of Article 3 of the ECHR into its national law. 
Since its continuing participation in that convention is in no way linked to its being a member of the 
European Union, the decision of that Member State to withdraw from the Union has no effect on its 
obligation to have due regard to Article 3 of the ECHR, to which Article 4 of the Charter corresponds, 
and, consequently, cannot justify the refusal to execute a European arrest warrant on the ground that 
the person surrendered would run the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the 
meaning of those provisions’.227 However, that finding sits uneasily with Petruhhin, where being party 
to the ECHR (as Russia is) was necessary but not sufficient.  
More remarkably, the Court in RO next emphasised that ‘Articles 27 and 28 of the Framework 
Decision respectively reflect Articles 14 and 15 of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 
December 1957. As was stated at the hearing before the Court, the United Kingdom has ratified that 
convention and has transposed the latter articles into its national law. It follows that the rights relied 
on by RO in those areas are, in essence, covered by the national legislation of the issuing Member 
State, irrespective of the withdrawal of that Member State from the European Union’.228 And even 
more remarkably still:  
 
As regards the deduction by the issuing Member State of any period of custody served in the 
executing Member State, in accordance with Article 26 of the Framework Decision, the United 
Kingdom has stated that it has also incorporated that obligation into its national law and that 
it applies that obligation, irrespective of EU law, to any person who is extradited into the 
United Kingdom. Since the rights resulting from Articles 26 to 28 of the Framework Decision 
and the fundamental rights laid down in Article 4 of the Charter are protected by provisions of 
national law in cases not only of surrender, but also of extradition, those rights are not 
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dependent on the application of the Framework Decision in the issuing Member State. It 
therefore appears, though subject to verification by the referring court, that there is no 
concrete evidence to suggest that RO will be deprived of the opportunity to assert those rights 
before the courts and tribunals of that Member State after its withdrawal from the European 
Union.229 
 
Advocate General Szpunar could not resist injecting a note of irony on this point: while he agreed that 
‘the UK has decided to withdraw from the EU, not to abandon the rule of law or the protection of 
fundamental rights’ and that there was therefore ‘no basis to question the UK’s continued 
commitment to fundamental rights’, he asked nevertheless to ‘be forgiven for adding that…as recently 
as 2016, the then UK Home Secretary [i.e. by the time of RO, the then UK Prime Minister Theresa May] 
pleaded for the UK to leave the ECHR’.230 More generally, the line taken by the Court here collapses 
together the system of EAW and the system of extradition – at least with respect to the UK – despite 
stressing that the former replaces the latter for EU Member States. The element of trust conveyed by 
the passage extracted above is therefore extended to a third State’s national arrangements. 
Yet perhaps most surprisingly of all, the Court next watered down the significance of access 
to the preliminary ruling system for the protection of EU rights. It pointed out that ‘recourse to the 
mechanism of a preliminary ruling procedure before the Court has not always been available to the 
courts and tribunals responsible for the application of the European arrest warrant. In particular…only 
on 1 December 2014, that is, five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, did the Court 
obtain full jurisdiction to interpret the Framework Decision’231 – rather conveniently ignoring the fact 
that the Charter, routinely also placed at the heart of the AFSJ system, was not legally binding until 
the Lisbon Treaty took effect either. The RO downplaying of the Article 267 TFEU procedure also 
stands in stark contrast with its characterisation as the ‘keystone’ of the Union’s judicial system in 
Commission v Poland, a system ‘intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law’ and ‘thereby serving to ensure its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the 
particular nature of the law established by the Treaties’.232 Moreover, ‘Article 19 TEU, which gives 
concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility 
for ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member States and judicial protection of the rights of 
individuals under that law to national courts and tribunals and to the Court of Justice’.233  
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For Konstadinides, ‘by elevating effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU 
law, referred to in Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, the ECJ is taking ownership of the 
Charter. Not only does it solidify its reputation as a fundamental rights court, but it also empowers 
individuals to defend common values which are gradually becoming uncommon in some Member 
States’.234 And yet, the Court was satisfied in RO that ‘the executing judicial authority is able to 
presume that, with respect to the person who is to be surrendered, the issuing Member State will 
apply the substantive content of the rights derived from the Framework Decision that are applicable 
in the period subsequent to the surrender, after the withdrawal of that Member State from the 
European Union. Such a presumption can be made if the national law of the issuing Member State 
incorporates the substantive content of those rights, particularly because of the continuing 
participation of that Member State in international conventions such as the European Convention on 
Extradition of 13 December 1957 and the ECHR, even after the withdrawal of that Member State from 
the European Union’.235 From the perspective of territory as legal place and common place. with 
strongly protective implications for Union citizens in consequence, the Court’s stifling in RO of the 
particularities of the AFSJ – of the differences between being inside and outside – is simply stunning. 
There is no reference to the Petruhhin line of case law. The ‘citizen’ is not mentioned, never mind 
protected, anywhere in the judgment. The European persona of the post-withdrawal UK almost 
seamlessly replaces its European Union membership.  
However, to achieve that outcome, the EU system is itself patently distorted: producing not 
just about parallel narratives across EU citizenship law but parallel narrative within the systemic 
narrative itself. Is there some way to join the framing of the judgment around the common values that 
underpin EU law and the comparably weak guarantees accepted as insurance that standards of 
protection offered in the territory of the UK both pending and after withdrawal from the Union will 
somehow be interchangeable? The answer lies, somewhat ironically, in the fact that membership of 
the Union really matters. Thus, in territorial terms, there is, for the Court, a far-reaching difference 
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between a State that is/was once inside, and a State that never was.236 For example, in her analysis of 
case studies that reflect ‘seeking’ (through acceding) and ‘shunning’ (through withdrawing) 
membership of the Union, and access to its citizenship in consequence, Shaw establishes that the 
Union ‘operates with a messy multi-layered constitutional structure and more complex sets of 
relationships than is often appreciated by those whose classic starting point is…a binary notion that a 
given state is either inside, or outside, the EU’.237  
The UK’s membership of the Union – and its consequential commitment to and sharing of the 
common values on which the Union is founded – generates ‘legacy’: a legacy that will continue to 
mean something in a legal as much as any other sense.238 In RO, the watering down of the legal 
premises that protect the territory of the Union – already crucial for constructing the foundational 
narrative and even more so for the protective narrative – suggests that even though the post-Brexit 
UK will no longer be part of Union territory in a physical sense, it can still be conceived as a part of 
Union territory within the meaning of Lindahl’s legal place and common place. In that sense, RO brings 
substance to Lindahl’s hypothesis that ‘if a territory is the concrete unity of normative and physical 
dimensions, then the relation between territoriality and legal power is far more intimate than meets 
the eye in this definition’.239 There are trace elements here of the ‘close connection’ and effects’ 
doctrines outlined in Section II of this paper, where we already saw that the Union’s physical territory 
and legal territory are do not correspond in all instances. But in the systemic narrative, the intersection 
of these ideas with the AFSJ – and with the aim of its future-proofing for post-Brexit scenarios in 
particular – takes that idea considerably further since membership and nationality connections with 
the UK would be formally severed. The system and therefore the narrative itself have to work harder 
to deal with these changes. Even if the UK is not going to be, for example, an EEA member, it is being 
lined up to occupy a similar legal place; at least for the purposes of EAW-like cooperation in the future. 
All of this resonates too with Scott’s ‘contested transition zone between the territorial and the 
extraterritorial’, characterised here by the extension of trust to a non-EU Member State.240  
The sustainability of that conception is, however, entirely contingent on what actually 
happens in the forum of the political negotiations. When the RO judgment was delivered, it was not 
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yet clear whether the withdrawal of the UK from the Union would be ‘orderly’241 or whether it would 
even happen at all. The political context was therefore acutely sensitive but also deeply chaotic. An 
assessment suggesting the actual or potential denigration of UK commitments and values would have 
been neither demonstrable nor helpful. And asking a national judicial authority somehow to predict 
what the standards of protection in a post-Brexit UK might be would clearly exceed any realistic 
expectation. RO reflects that context.242 But neither the citizen nor the territory of the Union as a 
‘special’ place finds any explicit reflection there.243 Does this mean that when systemic concern is 
prioritised by the Court, the citizen must be left out?  
  
C. Wightman: a route to integrated narratives 
 
When the Court is faced with – confronted by – particularly difficult choices, the examples presented 
in this paper show a gap in the function of explanation: situations are confronted; but critical 
implications of the Court’s own legal understanding of the EU ‘ecosystem’ tend to be suppressed; in 
the written judgments at least. This is how we end up with parallel narratives occupying the same 
legal space. The judgment in Wightman is, in contrast, perhaps one of the most ‘whole’ judgments 
that the Court has delivered, opening up the perspective of integrated narratives. The central legal 
question – whether a Member State who has notified its intention to withdraw from the Union may 
revoke that notification (it may) – is neither here nor there for present purposes; what stands out is 
the compelling and elegant completeness of the Court’s reasoning.244 In that sense, different threads 
of priority are brought together in one place; there is a sense of consolidation. First, drawing an 
explanatory line straight back to Van Gend en Loos and Costa, the Court reconfirms that the Treaties 
established a ‘new legal order, possessing its own institutions, for the benefit of which the Member 
 
241 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU, 29 
April 2017, para. 4. In AG Szpunar’s words, ‘[w]e know that we know next to nothing about the future legal 
relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom’ (AG Szpunar in Case C-327/18 PPU RO, EU:C:2018:644, 
para. 1 of the Opinion).  
242 It perhaps also, like LM, suggests that the Court will more comfortably take the burden of intervening in 
especially sensitive political disputes upon itself and other EU institutions) compared to what it will expect 
from national judicial actors: compare in particular Case C-216/18 PPU (Minister for Justice and Equality 
(Deficiencies in the system of justice) (LM), EU:C:2018:586 and Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, 
EU:C:2019:531 with respect to enforcing compliance with the values specified in Article 2 TEU. At the time of 
writing (July 2019), an appeal in LM is pending before the Irish Supreme Court.  
243 AG Szpunar did make one reference to Petruhhin to support the remark that ‘also in the case of extradition 
to a State outside the Union the Court applies the same principles as in Aranyosi and Căldăraru when 
interpreting the Treaty provisions on citizenship and non-discrimination and those of the Charter’ (AG Szpunar 
in Case C-327/18 PPU RO, EU:C:2018:644, para. 68 and fn63 of the Opinion). 
244 For present purposes at least; that is not to say that there are no open questions about the Article 50 
process itself; see generally, A Cuyvers, ‘Wightman, Brexit, and the sovereign right to remain’ (2019) 56 CML 
Rev, forthcoming.  
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States thereof have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which 
comprise not only those States but also their nationals’.245 It then affirms the autonomy of EU law 
‘with respect both to the law of the Member States and to international law’ and reiterates that such 
autonomy is ‘justified by the essential characteristics of the European Union and its law, relating in 
particular to the constitutional structure of the European Union and the very nature of that law’.246 
The purpose of the Treaties – ‘the creation of an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’ – is 
acknowledged.247 As to the kind of Union – the kind of place – thereby created, the Court ‘underline[s] 
the importance of the values of liberty and democracy, referred to in the second and fourth recitals 
of the preamble to the TEU, which are among the common values referred to in Article 2 of that Treaty 
and in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and which thus 
form part of the very foundations of the European Union legal order’.248 All of this articulates and 
explains the legal place and common place characteristics of the Union. 
Crucially for present purposes, the Court then gives equal billing to the two groups of 
beneficiaries articulated in Van Gend en Loos – the Member States and individuals. First, with 
particular resonance for Wightman itself, the Court affirmed that ‘the European Union is composed 
of States which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to those values’, recalling once again 
that EU law ‘is thus based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the 
other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values’.249 
Second, it is acknowledged that ‘since citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States…any withdrawal of a Member State from the European 
Union is liable to have a considerable impact on the rights of all Union citizens, including, inter alia, 
their right to free movement, as regards both nationals of the Member State concerned and nationals 
of other Member States’.250 The Court therefore concludes that ‘[i]n those circumstances, given that 
a State cannot be forced to accede to the European Union against its will, neither can it be forced to 
withdraw from the European Union against its will’.251 
In Wightman, the building blocks of the Union territory as a special legal place and a special 
common place picked out in different narratives across this paper are present now in one place: the 
narratives are integrated. In this instance, the State ‘wins’ but that is not inevitable. The Court refers 
once again to the free movement rights of Union citizens; but that does not guarantee that citizens 
 
245 Case C-621/18 Wightman, EU:C:2018:999, para. 44. 
246 Ibid para. 45.  
247 Ibid para. 61. 
248 Ibid para. 62. 
249 Ibid para. 63 (emphasis added). The Court then repeatedly casts the decision of a Member State to leave 
the European Union in the language of sovereignty: see paras 50, 56-57, 59 and 72.  
250 Ibid para. 64 (emphasis added). 
251 Ibid para. 65. 
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will ‘win’ in that respect in all Brexit situations. For example, I think that it is highly unlikely that free 
movement will be conferred judicially on UK nationals who reside in other EU Member States 
following Brexit;252 though the Court may well have protected Union citizens had European Parliament 
elections not been held in the UK in June 2019, which was a serious possibility at the time.253 Raucea 
rightly characterises ‘the emergence of the territory of the Union as a collective good that belongs to 
EU citizens and that, then, needs to be distributed among European citizens in fact, and not only on 
paper’.254 But it is necessary that the different actors and different interests involved in the production 
as well as the sharing of this ‘collective good’ are acknowledged and considered. There may be 
disagreement over outcome but there should not be (conscious) gaps in articulation or explanation.  
The integrated narrative does provoke a challenge: not to see every outcome that strengthens 
the EU legal order as a ‘loss’ for the citizen. This point is not made to suggest that examples of poor 
explanation and/or confrontation in the case law should just be overlooked or excused. But where 
reasonable accommodation of competing (or even just multiple) interests are articulated and openly 
weighed, however, it is also in the interest of Union citizens that the Union legal system is robust – 
and that it is protected. The concept of Union territory can accommodate all of these objectives: it 
constitutes a physical place within which Union citizenship rights, including but not only freedom of 
movement and residence, are realised; and also a place shielded not just by physical borders but 
through respect for, and enforcement of, the commonality of rights and values committed to by both 
national and Union institutions. For Azoulai, a deeper Union citizenship status lay precisely in the hope 
that ‘that a sense of connection to the whole can be revealed through the judicial consideration of 
socially contested or morally troubling cases, and that this consideration is driven by the introduction 
of a metaphorical statement (the “territory of the Union”) in the legal discourse’.255 He is right to 
caution that ‘[t]o go beyond the limited possibilities offered by a series of individual cases would 
require the support of the main European and national players. Only if this – extremely unlikely – 
event were to occur could this legal metaphor become anything more’.256 Integrating the parallel 
 
252 Article 79 TFEU provides that ‘1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, 
at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing 
legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas … (b) 
the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the 
conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States’. 
253 See e.g. S Peers ‘Brexit and Extending EU Membership: The Legal Issues’, 21 March 2019, at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/03/brexit-and-extending-eu-membership.html; with links to different 
legal views on the requirement to hold the elections in the context of Brexit.  
254 Raucea, n64 above, 490 (emphasis in original).  
255 Azoulai, n21 above, 203.  
256 Ibid. 
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narratives on territory and Union citizenship identified in this paper provides a route through this 




This paper has investigated the growing significance of the territory of the Union in EU citizenship law, 
disclosing different parallel narratives in that context. First, there is a ‘foundational’ narrative, 
ostensibly rooted in the facilitation and preservation of freedom of movement and residence but 
connected more substantively, in reality, to the idea of the Union as a distinctive place defined by 
distinctive rights and values. As the foundational narrative evolves, that wider as well as deeper 
dimension of its purpose has unfolded gradually in the relevant case law. Second, in the ‘protective’ 
narrative, the status of Union citizenship intersects with the purposes and qualities of the AFSJ. It was 
shown that the Court’s primary concern in this line of case law is to keep the business of Union citizens 
within the territory of the Union as much as possible. The purpose here is to protect the Union citizen 
from the uncertain consequences of exposure to ‘outside’. However, third, in the ‘systemic’ narrative, 
the Union citizen is either, in result or in reasoning, an absent figure. In other words, the Court explains 
things through a different dialect here; without express consideration of the implications for Union 
citizens and even in apparent contradiction to obligations spelled out under the other narratives.  
The three narratives of territory and Union citizenship are parallel in a formal as well as 
substantive sense. For example, the foundational narrative is built on Article 20 TFEU; while the 
protective narrative is built instead on Article 21 TFEU. The significance of free movement rights for 
Union citizenship permeates both sets of judgments; but its placement and its purpose in the different 
narratives changes, shifting from central to instrumental to absent. Importantly, however, all three 
narratives share a sense of contributing to the kind of legal place and common place that the Union 
actually is: to defining its specialness, more specifically, along territorial lines. In that light, the territory 
of the Union, like Union citizenship, has added meaning and significance – it is not, in other words, 
just a shorthand descriptor of the 28 territorial units that comprise it. State territories have joined 
together and created the territory of the Union, which has become something greater than the sum 
of those parts precisely through the process of giving legal meaning(s) to it. Nevertheless, on the basis 
of sincere cooperation, it is also true that the Union depends ultimately on the Member States to 
sustain its territory.  
The distinctive character of EU law and of the mechanisms and processes that it produces is 
ultimately central to the Court’s construction and invocation of territory as a legal construct. As would 
be expected, the added value of Union territory in that respect comes into sharpest relief when Union 
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citizens are potentially pushed beyond its borders. Most basically, these situations force consideration 
of what is different between the inside and the outside; and of which inside values, ultimately, are 
worth fighting for. In the foundational and protective narratives, however, the physical and normative 
borders of Union territory essentially coincide. In the systemic narrative, things become more 
complicated as competing internal tensions are laid bare. Where State interests are privileged in 
Pisciotti, there is justifiable criticism of how the protection promised by case law in the protective 
narrative then contracts, without that being clearly explained. Where post-Brexit relations with the 
UK are shaped in RO, the judgment swings disconcertingly between reaffirming the specialness of the 
Union as legal place and common place, on the one hand, and suppressing precisely the features and 
legal mechanisms that make it so, on the other. Mapping the fundamentals of the narratives 
themselves, all three of the basic components of the AFSJ – freedom (movement), security (protection) 
and justice (as a value protected by the system) – must somehow be kept in balance. 
It was argued that it is only by integrating the parallel narratives identified here that the full 
and remarkable complexity of the Union and of its legal order as well as its citizenship is both reflected 
and progressed. In this sense, it is ‘possible to transform the constitutional intentions expressed in the 
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship into a living truth without upsetting the constitutional balance set 
out in the Treaties’.257 Failing more consistently to confront the implications of continuing down the 
path of parallel narratives embeds not just benign but ultimately corrosive ambiguity with respect to 
the judicial contribution. This argument is certainly not about defending or excusing weakening 
protection for Union citizens. On the contrary, the judgment in Wightman provides a blueprint for a 
most necessary ‘process…enabling the European citizen to become increasingly relevant as a 
protagonist of European integration’.258 Importantly, though, while ‘[t]he Court will obviously play a 
part in shaping the scope of the status of this new, strong European citizenship’, it is also true that 
‘[t]he main weight of the challenge…does not currently lie on the shoulders of the lawyers, but on 
those of the citizens themselves. It is up to the citizens to decide…if the Union we are currently 
constructing is worth the effort’.259 If Union citizenship is the fundamental status of Member State 
nationals, then high demands for their protection are an inherent part of the Union system: and they 
must be appreciated as such. But an integrated narrative argument does perhaps challenge us to 
reconsider how we understand the idea of ‘losing’ a case in EU citizenship law; and to move beyond 
pitching ‘the citizen’ and/or ‘the State’ and/or ‘the EU’ against each other. The EU system is for the 
Member States and for Union citizens. There is really no point to it otherwise.  
 
257 Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, n78 above, 752; these authors emphasise the importance of democracy in 
that respect.   
258 Sarmiento and Sharpston, n127 above, 241 (emphasis added). 
259 Ibid 242. 
